

Military Intelligence

PB 34-93-2

APRIL-JUNE 1993

Volume 19 Number 2



- 2 Vantage Point
- 4 From the Editor
- 4 Letters
- 41 Proponent Notes
- 48 Total Force
- 50 Subscription Form
- 52 Training Notes
- 54 Professional Reading

FEATURES

- 6 **Intelligence Support to Operation "GIT'MO"**
by Captain James A. Vick Jr.
An in-depth look at the unique requirements for intelligence support in this politically volatile relief effort with a focus on the difficulties associated with nontactical operations.
- 10 **Danger in the Balkans**
by Michael S. Evancevich
No other situation in modern times so clearly illustrates the complexity of multi-ethnic cultures and hostilities which had lain buried under the shroud of former Soviet dominance. This probing article explores the intricacies of this unstable former Soviet republic with an historic look at some of the causes for its present conflict.
- 16 **Protect Our Future by Knowing the Past**
by Colonel Robert J. Covalucci
A look back to see our future through the eyes of history. An enlightened pursuit of new solutions by examining what has worked in the past, with an additional article entitled Back to the Future, also by Colonel Covalucci
- 19 **High Payoff Targets: When to Engage**
by Captain Richard E. Nock
This analytical article explores the determination of indirect priority fires and its place within the space-time environment of modern warfare.
- 24 **Air IPB and the BCTP Experience**
by Captain Shawn C. Weed
IPB is not just a two dimensional process. CPT Weed demonstrates the need for multidimensional preparation as part of the IPB process.

29 Intelligence and Aviation: A Strong Future

by Captain David B. Kneafsey

The Aviation Intelligence Officer program is outlined in this article which explains career management field 15C35.

31 CMF-98 Restructure Concept

by Chief Warrant Officer 3 John P. Root

New communications technologies signal changes in the signals intelligence community. The MI Proponent is taking a long hard look at the future of 98-series soldiers, their mission, and the future of military science.

32 The Changing Face of Fort Huachuca

by Colonel Robert B. Mangold and First Lieutenant Brent A. York

The only thing consistent is change, and this old axiom stands true once more as the Home of Military Intelligence modernizes and expands to fill its ever-expanding mission.

34 Tactical BDA Presentation Techniques

by Captain Chester F. Brown III

A graphic solution to the challenge faced by an intelligence officer to track the dynamic battlefield of today.

47 Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame

This special series recognizes the distinguished members of the Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame. Our first honoree is Colonel Carl F. Eifler.

52 Learning (Small Group Instruction) in an Academic Environment (BNCOC)

by Staff Sergeant Lucinda Tims

The 1991 TRADOC NCO Instructor of the Year, Tims shares her insights into Small Group Instruction and its benefits and demands on student and teacher alike.

STAFF

Commandant: *Major General Paul E. Menoher Jr.*

Director of Operations, Training, and Doctrine: *Colonel William C. Llewellyn*

Associate Editor: *Annette Castro*

Contributing Editor: *First Lieutenant Daniel J. Korzun*

Art Director: *Marvin H. Marcroft*

Administration: *Marie Valenti*

Typesetting: *Roger Johnson*

Carolyn Korona

*By Order of the
Secretary of the Army:*

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
*General, United States Army
Chief of Staff*

Milton H. Hamilton

Official: MR. MILTON H. HAMILTON
*Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army*

04327

Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, an authorized publication of the Department of the Army, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, AZ, is published quarterly under provisions of AR 25-30 and the TRADOC Professional Bulletin Policy Letter. This media is approved for the dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development. This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy nor product endorsement. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin reserves the right to edit material. Use of the third person pronoun "he" and any of its forms is intended to include both masculine and feminine genders. Inquiries, letters to the editor, manuscripts, supporting graphics, and subscription requests should be sent to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: AT29-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. For further information telephone DSN 879 0797 or commercial (602) 538 0797. Personal subscriptions are \$8.50 per year (domestic) and \$8.15 per year (foreign). Our FAX numbers are DSN 879-2130, or commercial (602) 538-2130.

Articles printed in the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin are not usually copyrighted and may be reprinted or reproduced. When reprinting articles, give credit to the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin and to the author. Articles marked "copyright" or "used with permission" may not be reproduced by any means without permission from the author.

VANTAGE POINT

By Major General Paul E. Menoher Jr.

This is the last article I will write for MIPB as the Commander of the Intelligence Center. On July 28, I will relinquish my command of the Intelligence Center to Major General John Stewart; on August 12, I will assume command of the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) from Major General Chuck Scanlon.

I leave the Intelligence Center with a strong sense of pride over what we have accomplished in the nearly four years I have had the privilege of commanding it. The changes that have occurred in our Branch over this period are so extensive I have referred to it as a "Revolution in Military Intelligence." When you reflect on these changes and those that will occur over the next few years, "revolution" may be an understatement. We are undergoing more changes than any other functional area in the Army, and more than at any single time in our Branch history.

Let me elaborate.

The first and probably largest element of change occurring in our Branch is the fielding of a new family of 14 systems (the flagship systems described in our Army Intelligence Master Plan). Several of these systems are already fielded to the first units equipped:

- ☐ The Imagery Processing and Dissemination System, Tactical Radar Correlator, and GUARDRAIL Common Sensor to V Corps.
- ☐ Airborne Recce Low and TRACKWOLF to INSCOM.

By the time this issue of MIPB goes to press we also should have fielded the following systems:

- ☐ All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Block I to the 82d Airborne Division.
- ☐ PRD-12, Tactical High Mobility Terminal (THMT), and TROJAN SPIRIT to several units.

In addition, we have the Joint STARS Ground Station Module (GSM) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)-Short Range as well as the Pioneer UAV at the Intelligence Center, where they are available now with trained operators for any contingency.

By this time next year—

- ☐ Joint STARS GSMs will have been fielded to

XVIII Airborne Corps units.

- ☐ The downsized version of the THMT—the Miniaturized Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT) mounted on a HMMWV—will have been fielded to six divisions.
- ☐ The dismounted or rack and stack version of the THMT—the FAST-I—will have been fielded to 13 other units.
- ☐ The Second GUARDRAIL Common Sensor to XVIII Airborne.
- ☐ The UAV-Short Range will only be months away from being fielded to the first two corps and the Intelligence Center.

Despite significantly reduced budgets, which have drastically impacted Army modernization, all of our flagship systems remain funded to be fielded by 1997. Most important, 10 of the 14 flagship systems will be to the first units equipped by the end of 1994.

These systems bring significant new capabilities, not the least of which are balance between disciplines and targeting accuracies: Seven of the new systems will provide targeting accuracies by themselves with one detection of the target; and five of the seven will broadcast their intelligence and targets simultaneously to brigade, division, and corps in real or near-real time.

To get the most out of the enormous capabilities in our new family of systems, we articulated a new Intelligence Branch Operational Concept (IBOC) and used it as the basis to develop new organizational designs for all of our Tables of Organization and Equipment organizations. The TRADOC commander approved our new IBOC, and the Chief of Staff, Army, personally approved our new organizational designs. We have already integrated our new systems, operational concept, and organizations into all our leader training courses (officer, warrant officer, and NCO), and added improved modules on collection management, synchronization planning, and predictive analysis as well.

We have also improved the tactical focus of all of our courses by regularly integrating lessons learned from the Combat Training Centers (CTCs)

(Continued on page 40)

By Command Sergeant Major James A. (Art) Johnson

As the Army continues to drawdown and reshape, it is very important that the welfare of our soldiers and their families remains a high priority. Our soldiers must be confident that their leadership is doing what is necessary to provide the best quality of life possible. With shrinking resources, this is a challenge requiring the support of all involved. Soldiers are the life blood of our MI Corps and deserve our best efforts.

One problem we need to address is getting NCOs to BNCOC on time. This has resulted in some staff sergeants not being sent before the DA Sergeant First Class Promotion Board. As I have stated before, promotions are now tied to the NCO Education System. If our NCOs don't attend school when scheduled, their promotions will be delayed until they do. In some cases, they may not even be considered until they complete the appropriate schooling. The NCO support chain must get involved in getting NCOs to BNCOC on time. Without your help this will be difficult to accomplish.

The soldiers in 97 series MOSs will be relieved to know that the NCO Academy has increased the 97B and 97E BNCOC classes by 200 percent. This will continue until October or until we get rid of the backlog. Much time and effort have gone into this increase and it would not have been accomplished without the help of MI Branch and PERSCOM.


The BNCOC for MOSs 97B and 97E has only been on line a short time. Because of this, PERSCOM has allowed an exception to the BNCOC completion requirement, with constraints, for those 97's who have not completed the course. PERSCOM has reviewed your records to determine why you

did not attend the course. If nonattendance was not your fault, your records were sent before the promotion board. However, if you were scheduled for BNCOC and did not have a valid reason for your absence, an exception was not granted and your record was not sent before the board. I was surprised to learn that some of our soldiers have been scheduled as many as seven times and did not attend. As we work to eliminate the backlog, this type of situation cannot continue. The exception to policy is a one-time exception, and it will not be offered in the future.

The construction at the NCO Academy has come a long way. The barracks are almost complete. They will have 184 rooms and house a total of 368 soldiers. Designed for small group instruction, the instructional facility is well on its way to completion. Both the barracks and the instructional facility will be furnished with state-of-the-art equipment and furniture. This is a real dream come true for the NCO corps, the Intelligence Center, and our MI Corps.

Another plus to this new facility is that our NCOs will finally be out of the World War II wooden buildings, and there will be enough space to move the BNCOC from Fort Devens to Fort Huachuca. The goal is to have all of our NCO Academy instruction here at the Home of Military Intelligence.

I need the help of all senior NCOs to ensure that soldiers who are sent to school meet all the requirements. We cannot afford to send NCOs to school who are overweight, cannot pass the physical fitness test, have personal problems which take away valuable instruction time, and lack self-discipline. NCOs, YOU MUST GET INVOLVED!



FROM THE EDITOR


In this time of transition and restructuring, we in the MI community are not immune to change. Today we say farewell to one of our greatest innovators and supporters not only in the field of military intelligence but also of MIPB directly. I would like to personally thank Major General Paul E. Menoher Jr. for his support and assistance over the last four years. Under his leadership, the two traditional roles of MIPB—a tool for continuing education and a forum for dialogue among MI professionals—have been reinvigorated. We at MIPB wish him the very best in his new position as Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. At the same time, we welcome Major General John F. Stewart Jr. as the new Commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca.

The 1st Infantry Division was the first to respond to Major General Menoher's call for dialogue with a series of articles on training (Oct-Dec 92 and Jan-Mar 93). The dialogue continues in the July-September issue with a series on Battlefield Operating System (BOS) integration. These articles are unique in that they are not from producers of intelligence, but from users. They have been written by soldiers from the other six BOSs—Maneuver, Fire Support, MOB/CMOB/SURV (NBC), Air Defense, Combat Service Support, and Command and Control. The purpose is to let MI know what these BOSs need from an S2 (or intelligence officer) and what they, in turn, can offer MI. This will be an informative series.

In this issue we continue a trend to publish articles that deal with the application of IPB to Operations Other Than War. Captain Vick's article is a reflection of the change our armed forces not only are anticipating, but also experiencing. This is the fourth article we've run on the changing roles of MI. Each of the four told of completely different experiences in vastly different environments.

I want to welcome to the MIPB staff our new Art Director, Marvin H. Marcroft. He brings with him much experience, expertise, and talent, and we welcome him to the staff.

Regretfully, we bid farewell to Marie Valenti, our administrative support for over two years. While working with the subscriptions, book reviews, and correspondence, she has had contact with many of you. She has provided tremendous support to this publication, and it is hard to imagine continuing without her contributions.



Ginette Carter

LETTERS

Dear Editor:

LTC William Wenger and 1LT Fredric Young's article, "The Los Angeles Riots and Tactical Intelligence" (Oct-Dec 1992), was very informative, and I'm sure their intelligence efforts were commendable. I do, however, take issue with some of the comments in this article.

The authors state, "It was impossible to prepare a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) because all of Los Angeles was a 'go' area for gangs and rioters." This statement simply demonstrates a lack of understanding as to what was needed to support the decision making process and a lack of experience in the use of

the analysis required in the IPB process. An MCOO could and should have been done for this operation.

They further state that "the tactical situation did not allow the preparation of an event template, doctrinal templates, a decision support template, nor a synchronization matrix." Again, this is a result of not understanding

the thought processes involved in developing these essential products, rather than the tactical situation. Many people get a superficial knowledge of the products developed from the IPB process and think they understand the process. What they really need to understand is the systematic thought processes behind the products and what the products are going to do to support decision making. If you understand the processes and how they allow you to focus assets and project enemy capabilities into the future battle then it is fairly easy to adapt IPB processes and products to Border Patrol operations, combat in cities, or a conventional enemy anywhere in the world.

All units with a civil disturbance role need to have a data bank on riots. Riots don't just happen. There are some indicators that can be collected on to provide early warning of where mobs will form and what directions they will take. Intelligence work requires a lot of research and attention to painstaking detail. In INTSUM #3, we see a lot of reporting of activities, but where is the analysis? What were they trying to tell their subordinate units? Products must be useful!

Priority Intelligence requirements, as shown on the spot report on page 33, also show a lack of knowledge about how to determine what intelligence is critical to the mission and what indicators can be collected to assist in developing this intelligence. The article stated PIR as "what is the nature and extent of the incident." This might be an indicator that would help satisfy a PIR but not the PIR itself. A commander's PIR for this situation might be: where and when will specific gangs attack?

Indicators need to be identified and spot reports need to be simple and factual. Use the SALUTE format. Analysis needs to be done at the collection center (S2 shop) not at the observer level.

The use in this article of the term "high value target (HVT)" is also doctrinally incorrect. FM 101-5-1, **Operational Terms and Symbols**, defines HVT as a target whose loss to the enemy can be expected to contribute

to substantial degradation of an important battlefield function. Potential enemy targets such as police stations and hospitals should be referred to as potential enemy targets or objectives. HVT should be used when analyzing enemy capabilities and developing plans to attack critical elements of the enemy (high payoff targets).

The intent of this article was to inform and share experience in the field. When doctrinally incorrect issues like these are printed by the Intelligence Center it adds to the fog of doctrinal applications and causes misunderstanding of the intelligence process. I hope the Center establishes some procedure for reviewing articles for doctrinal correctness before printing. MIPB is a valuable tool in educating the MI community when properly validated information is published.

MAJ George D. Womack
Fort Leavenworth, KS

Editor's Note: MIPB does not claim to publish only doctrinally accurate material. When MIPB authors cite doctrine, it must be cited accurately. But when they discuss how they perform tasks in their units, they cannot be held to the accuracy code because they may not, in fact, be performing the task according to doctrine. The Journal's mission—to serve as a forum for dialogue within the intelligence community—allows us to discuss and weigh tactics, techniques, and procedures that may deviate from doctrine or may not even be covered by doctrine yet. Indeed, MIPB articles occasionally drive changes in doctrine. MIPB endeavors to publish material that will provoke thoughtful, constructive comment, as did LTC Wenger and 1LT Young's article.

thinking on the future threat

The article is focused on the probable causes and geographical areas of future conflict. However, it did not address the increasing signs of internal instability within the United States. The potential for disorders on the scale of last year's Los Angeles riots cannot be ruled out. I also believe the recent World Trade Center bombing and the "Koreh stand-off" in Waco, TX, are good examples of what our own future portends.

The article's bottom line is that we still live in a largely segregated world (a regional model of inner-city decay compared to urban wealth). On one hand, we have the U.S. and other major industrial powers controlling world finance, arms production, research and development, and technological capacities. On the other hand, the underdeveloped countries continue to suffer from military, political, and economic paternalism forged during their relationships with the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The problem is that as long as we continue to "integrate" and form satisfied power blocs, it can only stimulate the "have not" countries to "play catch-up," especially in the area of arms production, acquisition, and military research and development. Along these same lines, the article states that at least "17 countries" will have nuclear weapons by the end of this decade. U.N. sanctions and the nuclear nonproliferation club will not deter the development and production of weapons of mass destruction.

Finally, the authors assume that the U.S. Intelligence community will, in the long run, be able to maintain its collection and analytical capabilities against projected future threats and deeper defense cuts. But, in my opinion, as our federal work force downsizes, so will our overall intelligence community, and, therefore, our intelligence capabilities.

Michael S. Evancevich
Sierra Vista, AZ

To better support your articles, we are requesting our readers to send photographs of MI operations, equipment, and exercises. These should be copyright free, include the full name of the photographer, and a brief note explaining what is in the picture. They can be color or black and white, fairly clear, in focus, and include a way to contact the photographer/owner. Unit PAOs are also encouraged to contact us as a resource.

Intelligence Support to Operation "GIT'MO"

by Captain James A. Vick Jr.

Conducting humanitarian assistance missions is no longer a new role for U.S. military forces. Recent operations of this nature include Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq; Operation GTMO (short for Guantanamo) in Cuba; Operation Provide Relief in hurricane ravaged Florida; and Operation Provide Hope in Somalia.

As in the other humanitarian operations, human intelligence (HUMINT) proved to be the cornerstone of intelligence support to Operation GTMO. Timely, accurate, and reliable HUMINT gave the commander the information needed to support the decision-making process and the ground operations.

Background

On November 23, 1991, the Secretary of Defense directed the deployment of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) from their home base at Fort Bragg to Guantanamo Bay. This was part of a Joint Task Force (JTF) headed by a Marine Corps general. The deployment to the naval base, which sailors call GTMO (Git'mo), marked the fourth time in less than two years the battalion had deployed on contingency operations: Operations Just Cause in Panama; Desert Shield/Storm; Provide Comfort; and now, Operation GTMO.

The battalion's mission at Guantanamo Bay was to provide emergency relief to thousands of Haitian migrants. They had fled their country in the wake of a bloody military coup which ousted President Jean Bertrand Aristide in October of 1991. For the commander of the 96th, it meant establishing and managing displaced persons camps for over 12,000 Haitians.

The Haitians fled from the military regime that ousted Haiti's first democratically elected president in over 50 years, and the grim poverty which makes



Photo courtesy of Captain Steve Smith

Children stand outside their tin shack homes in Port-au-Prince. The "stream" in front of them is raw sewage.


Haiti the poorest country in the region. They risked death as they set out on rough seas in dangerously overcrowded wooden boats. The U.S. Coast Guard and Navy intervened and rescued the Haitians and took them to migrant camps set up on an abandoned airstrip at Guantanamo.

Joint military forces provided food, shelter, clothing, and medical attention. Then the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) interviewed them for possible transfer to the U.S. as political refugees. My nine-man S2 section was charged with linking into the JTF J2, the Naval Intelligence Staff for the base, and the Coast Guard Intelligence Center at Guantanamo.

We soon discovered that the best intelligence was not to come from formal intelligence channels but from an unexpected source—U.S. military Creole-speaking interpreters.

Intelligence is for the Commander

The principle tenet of all intelligence personnel, "Intelligence is for the commander,"¹ is as applicable in humanitarian operations as it is in combat operations, with one variation. In humanitarian operations, a more accurate statement would be, "HUMINT is for the commander."



Raw sewage and garbage flow through the streets of Port-au-Prince.

Photo courtesy of Captain Steve Smith

The Army categorizes humanitarian assistance operations as Peacetime Contingency Operations (PCOs) which fall under the umbrella of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).² LIC operations rely heavily on HUMINT to satisfy the commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). Operation GTMO was no exception. HUMINT not only supported the commander by satisfying his PIR, but it also fulfilled the six intelligence functions found in **FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence**.

Intelligence in PCOs

PCOs, including humanitarian assistance missions like Operation GTMO, are by definition politically sensitive military operations. They are characterized by short term, rapid projection of tailored (joint) forces in conditions short of war to solve a specific problem or situation.³ Humanitarian missions require that intelligence personnel view the environment in a different way—like when a photographer changes the lens on his camera to bring a distorted image into focus. Likewise, we changed the conventional lens on our IPB and analysis camera to a LIC lens.

Operation GTMO was a classic PCO. Since there's no enemy or battlefield in these missions, we had to modify the constructs of the six intelligence functions. We found ourselves working directly with marines, airmen, sailors, Coast Guard, and groups like the INS and U.N. The involvement of all five services and other agencies, coupled with the dynamic environment typical of PCOs, required proactive and integrated intelligence support from intelligence representatives from all the services. The net result was a unique environment requiring unique intelligence.

The Six Intelligence Functions

MI personnel at Guantanamo performed the same six primary intelligence functions that support the commander's decision-making process on the battlefield. However, they were modified to fit a humanitarian mission and to answer the commander's PIR. The six functions are—

1. Indications and Warning (I&W).
2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).
3. Situation Development.
4. Target Development and Target Acquisition.
5. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
6. Force Protection.⁴

Indications and Warning

On the battlefield, I&W gives the commander intelligence on imminent hostilities or attack. During Operation GTMO, I&W gave the commander intelligence on migrants leaving Haiti. Early warning of an exodus from a city, town, or village in Haiti allowed the JTF commander to direct Coast Guard

and naval vessels toward waterways in the Gulf of Gonave (near Port-au-Prince, Haiti's capital) or the Windward Passage between Haiti and Cuba.

I&W information on a potential exodus was all source.

1. HUMINT sources in Haiti, especially Defense Attaches in Port-au-Prince, provided on-the-ground warning of events that might trigger an exodus.

2. National imagery intelligence sources provided indicators of boat building and voyage preparations in coastal towns.

3. Shipboard radars allowed the Coast Guard and Navy to locate the vessels on the high seas. The radars became especially critical during hurricane season when heavy seas and high winds could easily capsize the overloaded boats which could result in near certain death for all on board.

I&W played a different role in the migrant camps at Guantanamo. Early warning of arriving migrants allowed planners to provide tents and meals, to coordinate transportation, and to request logistic support. Daily camp operation hinged on the I&W information we got from various sources including the Coast Guard and Navy; the JTF-J2/J3; Commander in Chief, Atlantic, J2; and the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Conventional IPB analyzes the battlefield in terms of length, width, depth, and height; and integrates the environment with the enemy's doctrine to paint a picture of his most probable courses of action (COAs).⁵ The following shows how we modified the IPB process for Operation GTMO:

- ☐ Battlefield Area Evaluation became "Migrant Area Evaluation."
- ☐ Terrain and Weather Analyses were examined in terms of their impact on the migrant camp population.
- ☐ Threat Evaluation focused on any destabilizing influences in the camps.
- ☐ Threat Integration became "Humanitarian Support Integration."⁶

Migrant Area Evaluation. As in most LIC scenarios, areas of operations and interest were nonlinear. The area of operations included the migrant camps, the Gulf of Gonave, and Windward Pass. The area of interest included the entire country of Haiti, its coastal waters and sea lanes leading to the U.S., and even the eastern coast of Cuba. Events in Port-au-Prince and other population centers in Haiti had a direct impact on JTF-GTMO operations.

In January 1992, rumors of a military-sponsored massacre in Port-au-Prince reached Cape Haitian on Haiti's northern coast. Over 3,000 Haitians took to

the high seas in any boat that would float—and some that didn't float. Rescue efforts included the enlistment of naval vessels on training rotation at Guantanamo because Coast Guard cutters were already filled to the point of foundering with migrants. Camp operations were overwhelmed for days with the influx of thousands of newly arrived migrants. Finally, HUMINT sources in Haiti were able to verify that the rumors were unfounded. At this point, embassy representatives went to Cape Haitien to calm the locals and to prevent an even larger exodus.

Terrain. The key terrain was the population in the camps. For MI personnel who define the battlefield in terms of hilltops and avenues of approach, Haitian migrants in displaced person camps were unfamiliar terrain. To understand this terrain, we had to bridge the cultural gap between the U.S. service members of the JTF and the Haitian migrants. **The cultural gap was the single largest obstacle to our intelligence effort.**

The mission of Civil Affairs specialists is to "understand the people they're dealing with."⁷ These specialists were in a position to provide invaluable information to the JTF. Nevertheless, we learned very quickly that a true understanding of the intelligence situation required Civil Affairs specialists to spend time in the camps learning the Haitian language and culture first-hand.

Time in the camps taught us that the most valuable insight into Haitian life came from U.S. military interpreters. They not only spoke Haitian Creole fluently, but many were also first- or second-generation Americans from Haiti. These interpreters were able to bridge the gap between U.S. forces and the Haitians and they also were an invaluable source of reliable intelligence. Daily debriefings with these individuals yielded an information harvest.

The interpreters were also used to disseminate information in the camps since the migrants inherently trusted them, some of whom had family in Haiti. Since literacy rates are low, Haitians rely mainly on word of mouth to spread news.

One example of the intelligence contribution the interpreters made had to do with the meaning of the word "family." Apparently, "family" means one thing to Haitians and something else to Americans. Americans define family as a nucleus consisting of father, mother, children, and close blood relations. Haitians, on the other hand, define "family" more broadly.

A Haitian's family includes immediate relatives and a broad extended family of, among others, cousins, uncles, aunts, friends, and neighbors. One migrant referred to a man he met on the arduous boat ride from Haiti as his "brother." As a result, they

were processed into the camp and through immigration screening together as family members. Only when one man was screened for entry into the U.S. and the other was screened out for repatriation to Haiti did we realize they were not actually related. The result of this insight was a more thorough screening of the migrants by both the INS and military camp administrators.

Weather. Weather had a direct impact on Guantanamo relief operations. High winds and turbulent seas prevented migrants from leaving Haiti. Low winds and calm seas meant more migrants would be able to leave, be interdicted by the Coast Guard, and end up in the camps. Weather also affected migrants living in tents at Guantanamo. Hot, humid days, with temperatures reaching over 110 degrees Fahrenheit on the tarmac, caused heat casualties and lethargy. Since cooler nights saw increased activity, security and intelligence personnel were put on swing shifts to provide better coverage of nighttime activity.

Threat Evaluation. The threat during Operation GTMO was ambiguous and came from unexpected sources. The primary threats to the mission's success were boredom and discontent. Boredom led to fighting, petty theft, assault, unsanitary conditions, and mischief. To relieve boredom, camp commanders organized voluntary work details, movies at night, and sports activities, especially soccer—the national sport of Haiti.

Despite these efforts, widespread discontent proved to be the biggest threat to the stability, security, and safety of both the migrants and JTF personnel. The migrants grew impatient as the legal battle wore on over repatriation of Haitians screened out by the INS. During this legal battle, no screened out migrants could be repatriated to Haiti. The lack of movement and activity led some migrants to believe they were prisoners of the American military. Remember, in Haiti, the military is feared and hated and is the very reason why many of the migrants fled their homes.

When several young men in one of the camps spread a rumor that none of the migrants would ever leave Guantanamo Naval Base, fear and frustration led to a riot. On December 15, 1991, young men of Camp 2 decided to take control of their destinies and broke out of the camp in an effort to steal boats and sail to America. The Military Police (MP) quickly regained control of the camp and, by December 17, the situation was diffused.

The intelligence lesson learned from this incident was clear:

- ☐ We failed to heed indicators of discontent that were evident for weeks before the riot.
- ☐ No one in the JTF believed the Haitians would

organize themselves enough to take over a camp.

- Civil Affairs, MPs, and support personnel noticed indicators right before the riot, but failed to report them through intelligence channels.

On December 14, we overlooked one of the most obvious indicators. Cooks reported that only half of the migrants showed up for dinner that day. But we failed to make the connection because we didn't know that hunger strikes are a common form of public demonstration in Haiti. In the camps, Haitians used them to express their anger. This was another cultural aspect we were unfamiliar with.

Prevention of another riot was at the top of the JTF commander's priorities, so 96B Intelligence Analysts from the 96th helped the J2 staff develop PIR concerning migrant discontent. The analysts also created and disseminated an indicators card with Specific Information Requirements to all personnel, with explicit instructions to report indicator related information to intelligence personnel immediately.

Army and Marine counterintelligence (CI) personnel played a key role in identifying ringleaders of unrest and in weeding out troublemakers. Removing key leaders from the camps for a week allowed the situation to calm down and order to be restored.



A Navy interpreter tries to calm down an angry group, the day of the riot in Camp 2 (December 15, 1991). The group wrote on an Army cot with shaving cream the following: "We don't want to stay more—We want to leave".

Humanitarian Support Integration. Integrating Haitian cultural factors with weather and the situation in the camps and preparing predictive analysis reports became our bread and butter. We developed a broad base collection plan to make sure indicators of discontent were not overlooked again. The collection plan covered everyone working in the camps, including support personnel and cooks.

Situation Development

We were now able to predict COAs based on indicators of migrant activity collected and analyzed daily. Our monitoring, analyzing, and reporting

Photo courtesy of Captain Tim Richards

enabled the JTF's J2 to make timely recommendations to the JTF commander. When U.S. courts approved repatriation, fear of another riot ran high among JTF military forces.

Reliable predictive analysis was critical to the repatriation efforts. Along with the J2, we developed several COAs predicting migrant responses to repatriation. The J3 used these COAs to develop responses to potential migrant protests. Preemptive steps were taken to prevent problems during repatriation including psychological operations (PSYOP) and increased MP security.

Target Development and Target Acquisition

Intelligence supported psychological targeting of the Haitians by feeding the JTF PSYOP team information about migrant concerns. Again, our primary sources of this information were the interpreters and intelligence personnel working in the camps every day. PSYOP personnel used this intelligence to prepare PSYOP themes in a daily newspaper published in Creole. A Creole radio station was also established to play music and broadcast news reports throughout the camps. The target of both the newspaper and radio broadcasts were to alleviate boredom and discontent. News of ousted President Jean Bertrand Aristide and events in Haiti were of vital interest to the migrants, particularly when we began to repatriate them to Haiti.

Battle Damage Assessment

Since no bombs were dropped or rounds fired, we focused on the effectiveness of the PSYOP products and the overall impact of PSYOP operations on the migrants' welfare and mind-set. The intelligence reports we produced by debriefing camp personnel and interpreters gave the PSYOP teams useful feedback on their newspaper and radio broadcasts. Both were effective in combatting boredom and in squelching rumors.

Force Protection

The commander's primary concern was protecting not only U.S. forces but also the Haitians entrusted to his care. CI personnel focused on how to prevent U.S. personnel from being hurt in the course of caring for the migrants. They also established networks of informants to tip them off to any criminal element.⁸

One of the most effective ways of preventing trouble in the camps was the establishment of Haitian leadership. These leaders had direct access to camp commanders and helped to make life more bearable and to prevent trouble. Haitian camp leaders also helped out by reporting troublemakers to

(Continued on page 50)

DANGER in the BALKANS

by Michael S. Evancevich

Editor's Note: The situation in the former Yugoslavia is such that, by the time you read this, some of the information may have been overtaken by events.

The crisis in the former Yugoslavia is emerging as a major test for the United States, its allies, and the United Nations. The effects of "ethnic cleansing," continued fighting, and the inability to resolve the conflict threaten to ignite the Third Balkans War of this century.


Until recently, Yugoslavia was known as The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It consisted of six republics—Slovenia; Croatia; Bosnia (including a small area at the tip called Hercegovina); Serbia (with autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina); Montenegro; and Macedonia.


It was not long after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1989 that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began to unravel also:

- ☐ **Croatia** and **Slovenia** seceded from the federation in October, 1991.
- ☐ The Serb minority in **Bosnia** proclaimed a Serb Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina (SRBH), in early 1992, with its capitol in Pale, near Sarajevo.
- ☐ **Serbia** and **Montenegro** created a new Federal State of Yugoslavia in April 1992.
- ☐ **Macedonia** gained independence from Yugoslavia in early 1992 and maintains a tenuous political, military, and economic relationship with all of its neighbors. (Map Inset 1 shows how the former Yugoslavia is divided up.)

The disintegration of the post-Tito Yugoslavia brought with it a resurgence of ancient rivalries. The principal adversaries in this ethnic matrix are the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Croats who also live in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In addition, there are external links to the ethnic conflict in Bosnia involving Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro. It is these external military, political, and economic links that fuel the present conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Croatian and Bosnian Serb regular and militia forces control about a third of the "independent" Republic of Croatia and almost three-quarters of "independent" Bosnia-Hercegovina. (Map





Inset 2 shows the primary ethnic group breakdown by republic and autonomous region.)

Historical Perspective

The history of the Balkans area (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey), and especially the former Yugoslavia, is rife with wars, revolutions, terrorism, anarchy, and empire building. The Balkans has at various times been part of the Roman, Venetian, Austro-Hungarian, Serb, Ottoman, and most recently, Communist empires.

"Ethnic cleansing" is not new to Yugoslavia. All of the conquerors of that region used brutality to maintain their rule in the Balkans, and especially in Yugoslavia.

The First Balkans War started with revolts against The Ottoman Empire in Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. It ended in 1912 with the overthrow of Turkish rule. The 1913 Treaty of London gave the Serbs most of what is now Yugoslavia, except Bosnia. The Second Balkans War broke out in 1913 when Bulgaria attempted to annex Macedonia, which it considers part of its territory. After eight months of war the Bulgarians sued for peace.

But peace did not last. In 1914, Serb nationalists,

incensed over Austro-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife while they visited Sarajevo. Shortly after, the First World War began, and Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian forces occupied what was Yugoslavia.

In 1918, after World War I and the collapse of the Central Powers, King Alexander formed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. But because of increasing terrorist and nationalist activities, a dictatorship was established to maintain "internal stability." Basic civil liberties were denied, local self-government was abolished, and strict laws against sedition, terrorism, and the propagation of communism were decreed.

During this interwar period, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria posed external threats to Yugoslavia: fascist Italy's invasion of Albania; Hungary's designs on Vojvodina; and Bulgaria's on

Macedonia. In October 1934, a Macedonian terrorist assassinated King Alexander in Marseilles, and Yugoslavia subsequently came under the rule of a three-man regency.

With the Nazi Party on the rise, Yugoslavia's rulers were being pressured to join the pro-Axis "Tripartite Pact," whose membership included Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Before this could happen, the regency was deposed by a Serb-led military coup. But Yugoslavia would soon have more pressing issues to worry about—on April 6, 1941, Germany invaded Yugoslavia. On April 17, 1941, the Yugoslav government surrendered unconditionally and soon Yugoslavia was occupied by German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian forces. Under German-appointed head of state General Ante Pavelic, the puppet state of Croatia was proclaimed and Bosnia annexed. (See Figure 1.)

During World War II, extensive partisan operations were mounted against the Axis occupation forces. Partisan leaders included Colonel Milhailovic who commanded the *Chetnik* forces and represented the monarchy exiled in London; and Joseph Broz (aka Marshal Tito) who organized the communist partisans. The British Special Operations Executive and the American OSS supported



Figure 1. Partition of Yugoslavia.

these two major Yugoslav resistance groups.

During this period, ethnic cleansing was again being carried out in Yugoslavia. Citizens suffered wartime atrocities, perpetrated by Pro-Nazi, communist, and anticommunist elements, that appalled even senior German commanders. Pro-Nazi Croat and Bosnian Muslim forces killed hundreds of thousands of Serbs in order to exterminate all alien elements (non-Croat elements) in Croatia.

Bosnian Muslims created an SS-type division to assist the Croats in the ethnic "purification" program. Much of the ethnic cleansing occurring today in Bosnia-Herzegovina has links to atrocities the Croats and Bosnians committed against the Serbs during the Second World War. Of the 1.7 million Yugoslavs killed during the war, more than 1.2 million (including 700,000 Serbs) were killed by other Yugoslavs.

Eventually, communist forces under Tito (who was a Croat) were able to gain political control of Yugoslavia and install a Soviet-style socialist republic. From 1945 to 1948, Yugoslavia evolved from postwar retribution against collaborators and anticommunist political elements, to internal politi-

cal consolidation, and on to economic recovery.

Post-World War II

In 1948, Tito refused to follow Soviet Communist Party orders and broke with Moscow. From that point on, communist countries world-wide boycotted Yugoslavia. Moscow and other former Warsaw Pact countries directed a program of subversion and propaganda to destroy Tito's government. However, on the plus side, because of Yugoslavia's break with Moscow, Tito was instrumental in cutting off military aid to, and the ultimate defeat of, the Greek communist partisans during the Greek Civil War from 1946 to 1949.

Throughout this period, Tito's regime prospered. From 1948 until his death

in 1980, Tito modified the communist system in Yugoslavia and cultivated political, economic, and cultural contacts with the capitalist world under the banner of "nonalignment." He instituted a policy of "socialist self-management." This policy was designed to minimize ethnic nationalism within the republics and autonomous regions while providing mechanisms for the republics to manage their own economic affairs with minimal interference from Belgrade.

To discourage ethnic rivalries, Tito outlawed expressions of ethnic nationalism. He swiftly crushed nationalist demonstrations and other antigovernment activity. During Tito's 40-year communist rule, Yugoslavs experienced relative internal ethnic peace. External threats came from the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.

After Tito's death, a collective federal presidency ruled Yugoslavia. These rulers attempted to maintain stability while further improving industrial and economic development. However, disharmony and decay soon reappeared, fueled by—

- Economic underdevelopment in the southern republics.

- ☐ High inflation and unemployment.
- ☐ Defaults on international loans.
- ☐ Resentment against Communist Party rule and the perceived centrist government in Belgrade.
- ☐ Perceived preference given to Serbs in military, economic, and political structures.
- ☐ The presence of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) in the republics and autonomous regions.
- ☐ The sudden breakup of the communist system in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991.

Over a 10-year span, these events sowed the seeds of ethnic nationalism and independence movements in the republics. In 1988, the Belgrade government instituted stringent political, internal security, and military measures to crush the independence movement, including—

- ☐ Arresting dissidents.
- ☐ Outlawing demonstrations against Yugoslav institutions.
- ☐ Removing (sometimes en masse) government officials who didn't toe the Belgrade line.
- ☐ Moving additional YPA units and internal security forces into the republics and autonomous regions.

The Belgrade government could not stem the tide of dissent. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia proclaimed their independence from what was Yugoslavia. The United States and the European Community have formally recognized all of these republics, except Macedonia.

Yugoslav People's Army

The YPA (or the Yugoslav Army [YA] as it is known today) consists of an army, air force, navy, and the Territorial Defense Force. It is a conscript force with a core of professional officers and NCOs. In 1952, the YPA numbered about 500,000 and was organized to repel a Soviet-led invasion. During the Cold War, the U.S. gave Yugoslavia \$600 million in military grants and an equal amount in economic aid. In addition, a formal U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group operated in Belgrade from 1951 to 1961.

The YA currently numbers about 85,000. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, the YA reorganized its force structure by eliminating divisional units and establishing the brigade as the largest operational unit. Of 12 infantry divisions, 10 were converted into 29 tank, mechanized, and mountain infantry brigades with integral artillery, air defense, and anti-tank regiments. (Figure 2 shows the organization of the Yugoslav armed forces; Figure 3 shows their command and control.)

The YA has U.S., Soviet, and domestically-produced equipment. These range from the Soviet T-34 tank to the Yugoslav version of the T-72 tank, the M-84. The YA has—

- ☐ 750 tanks and 850 armored personnel carriers (APCs) with Soviet-produced BTRs and BRDM-2's, and U.S. M-3's.
- ☐ 1,000 artillery and 6,000 mortars. This includes 100, 122, 130, 152, and 155 mm towed guns, and 82 and 120 mm mortars including a self-propelled version mounted on M-60PB APCs.




Figure 2. Organization of the armed forces.




Figure 3. Command and control of the armed forces.

- ☐ Battlefield multiple rocket launcher systems and FROG-7 SSMs.

In terms of air defense weapons, the YA has 4 SAMs and 11 antiaircraft artillery (AAA) regiments. It uses tactical SA-6 mobile medium-range SAMs, man-portable SA-7's, SA-9's, and strategic SAM systems including the SA-2 and SA-3. The conventional AAA weapons inventory numbers 5,000 guns including a mixture from 20 to 90 mm systems.

Overall, the army lacks adequate firepower and mobility and has outdated equipment. In some cases, the YA is still using equipment captured from Axis forces during World War II.

Current Situation

This is a short overview of events that brought about the current crisis in the former Yugoslavia:

- ☐ January and February 1990: Mass protests in Kosovo for the restoration of national and human rights, free elections, and free press—29 killed.
- ☐ April and May 1990: Croatian and Slovenian Communist Parties were defeated in multi-party elections.
- ☐ September 1990: Albanian Yugoslav deputies proclaim a separate constitution and independence for Kosovo.
- ☐ September 1990: Serbia abolishes self-rule in Kosovo and Vojvodina.

- ☐ December 1990: Slovenia declares sovereignty.
- ☐ January 1991: Federal constitutional court annuls Slovenia's declaration of sovereignty.
- ☐ March 1991: Slobodan Milosevic becomes Serb president and threatens to arm Serbs living in Croatia unless Croatian paramilitary forces disarm.
- ☐ June 1991: Croatian and Slovenian legislatures declare independence.
- ☐ April 1992: Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaims independence.

The current phase of ethnic conflict began in Slovenia in June 1991 when the YA attempted to crush the Slovenian independence movement. The Yugoslav federal forces were unsuccessful in Slovenia primarily due to these factors:

- ☐ **YA tactical incompetence.** The lack of effective command and control hampered YA forces sent to reinforce federal army garrisons in Slovenia.
- ☐ **Effective use of Slovenian partisan warfare tactics.** The YA got bogged down and was cut off from its logistic infrastructure, and had to withdraw from Slovenia in less than 45 days.
- ☐ **The lack of ethnic Serbs living in Slovenia.** Serbs make up only two percent of the population of Slovenia. Slovenians never considered themselves part of the Yugoslav

Federal Socialist Republic. Ethnic cleansing would not work in Slovenia, and continued occupation by Yugoslav Forces would have been untenable for the Belgrade government.

In July 1991, as the YA withdrew from Slovenia into Croatia, it tried to crush the newly independent state of Croatia, and fighting broke out in the Osijek and Vukovar regions of eastern Croatia. The Yugoslav air force bombed Croatia's capital city, Zagreb, and launched another offensive into southern Dalmatia (part of Croatia) to capture the port city of Dubrovnik.

Fighting also broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina after YA units and Yugoslav federal agencies began withdrawing from that country. Adversaries were—


- ☐ The ethnic Bosnian Serb militias reinforced by former YA personnel "demobilized" when

The Serbs accomplished several key objectives:

- ☐ Captured more territory.
- ☐ Forced the Bosnian Muslims to flee (part of the ethnic cleansing process).
- ☐ Moved in ethnic Serbs to replace Muslims driven out or killed.

Although officially denied, the YA in Belgrade controls the Bosnian Serb forces. Serbia's objectives are to incorporate as much territory as possible out of what was Yugoslavia and to repopulate those territories with as many ethnic Serbs as possible. The new territorial acquisitions will become part of a "greater Serbia." All of the Serb autonomous zones in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have requested political, military, and economic union with the Serb government in Belgrade.

Despite U.N. sanctions, Serbia has stockpiled enough arms to keep the war in Bosnia-Her-



the YA pulled out of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- ☐ Military elements of Bosnia-Herzegovina's lawful government.
- ☐ Croatian irregular forces that do not recognize the Sarajevo government's authority.

The withdrawing YA transferred tons of heavy military equipment (tanks, artillery, mortars, and ammunition) to Bosnian Serb forces.

When the SRBH proclaimed its independence, Serb forces attacked the towns of Gorazde, Gradacac, and Brcko, and lay siege to Sarajevo. Serb forces used a basic "siege doctrine" as a battle tactic to capture towns and villages in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The siege doctrine states: Surround the area and use extensive artillery and mortar fires at random to force the people to flee; build up forces and equipment; then assault the area directly.

cegovina and elsewhere going for years, and continues to buy arms. River barges and trucks transport military supplies from Serbia into Serb-held territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina, without U.N. interdiction.

Serb regular and irregular forces number about 80,000. The head of the SRBH is Radovan Karadzic and the commander of Bosnian Serb forces is Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic. (Map Inset 3 shows Bosnia-Herzegovina areas controlled by Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.)

Prospects for Peace

Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina have military superiority. It is estimated they currently control around 80 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina territory. The

(Continued on page 51)

Protect our Future by *Knowing the Past*

by Colonel Robert J. Covalucci

History is often the most prodigious teacher. Unfortunately, we're often so involved in solving today's problems we don't make time to investigate yesterday's solutions. Hence the expression, "we are doomed to relive the past." If this is so, what can MI professionals do to reverse this trend?

Needless to say, we can study the past to discover how people solved problems similar to ours. Then we can evaluate these solutions to see if they would serve our situation. Next, we must have the conviction to learn from our investigation, and to act upon what we've learned. This, however, may be easier said than done!

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, U.S. Army leadership determined that intelligence support to commanders in the field was fragmented and often failed to serve the commander's needs. The commander had to deal with numerous intelligence organizations that provided information to him and his intelligence officer. The intelligence officer then had to piece together the information and make predictions on enemy intentions, locations, and equipment. The true challenge was that neither the commander nor the intelligence officer had command and control over most of these collection assets.

What was out there? This list gives you an idea of what the situation was like:

- ☐ An organic or attached MI detachment or company supported most units.
- ☐ An Army Security Agency (ASA) company might be in direct support.
- ☐ Corps and theater intelligence assets passed information down.
- ☐ Interrogation assets might be attached.
- ☐ Provincial reconnaissance units might provide information to support combat operations.

In the Vietnam Delta, sea-air-land teams collected valuable information during combat operations. A group of Army agents and other intelligence agencies provided information, as did organic helicopter and observation aircraft. Additionally, there was the entire Army of Vietnam intelligence system, made into our image and likeness, that produced information and filtered it into the Army Intelligence system. Confused yet? Well, you're not alone; so were our commanders in the field. Sounds like a new problem to me! But was it a new problem? What would a study of history tell us?

Let's look at one World War II campaign: General George S. Patton's campaign in the Lorraine region of France from September to December 1944. Here are some observations the 3d Army G2 made.

Operational Factors

Observation. Throughout the Lorraine Campaign, counterintelligence (CI) operations were seriously handicapped by the lack of skilled linguists who had adequate knowledge of the countries they were operating in. This deficiency harmed our intelligence collection efforts. Although it's impossible to know how many American lives were lost as a result, we have to acknowledge that a significant amount of intelligence never surfaced.

Comment. Second-language capability is a serious problem, not only in our Armed Forces but also in all branches of federal service. In today's CI units many positions are not coded with a foreign language requirement; and of those that are, many mismatches exist. This fact, coupled with fewer first-generation Americans who learned their second language at the dinner table, will further erode our ability to conduct CI operations.

To defuse this crisis, we are undertaking an initiative to make all CI positions language required. While this will provide an organizational solution, the Army should require all members of academies and ROTC units and active duty personnel in masters' programs to qualify in a second language. We should periodically test and record this skill. Only by developing an extensive pool of highly qualified linguists can we hope to meet future war-time demands.

Observation. Capturing troops lost valuable intelligence because they failed to recognize the importance of the material and failed to follow standard evacuation procedures.

Comment. Understandably, combat soldiers are trained in self-protection and offensive operations. This must be the priority in unit training. What we must do better is to integrate intelligence training into combat training. Commanders must demand that enemy-prisoner-of-war and document handling be rigorously practiced in every ARTEP and NTC/ROTC rotation. We should reward units that manage this training well with tactical advantages during the exercise.

Observation. Human intelligence (HUMINT) played a vital role in the 3d Army's success. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agents conducted

operations that produced sole-source information upon which tactical decisions were based. During this campaign, the OSS had the advantage of working in an area of operations that had been held by the Allies.

Comment. In today's technologically-oriented world, we have a fixation that "bright and shiny" collection means better. It is difficult to quantify the results of agent operations, particularly in peacetime. This led to an erosion of our clandestine and tactical agent operations. Yet while we pump megadollars into sophisticated satellite and mechanical collection systems, we are quick to acknowledge that human verification is critical to any arms limitation treaty. We must also acknowledge that agent operations are a sole source that can decisively influence the outcome of any conflict. To prepare ourselves for the next conflict, we must establish the basis for agent operations in peacetime.

Organizational Factors

Observation. Based on War Department tables of organization and equipment (TOE), the Army G2 section was authorized 48 soldiers. In addition, 3d Army had 295 soldiers attached to the G2 section from a variety of organizations. These attachments greatly complicated the management and administration of the G2 section.

Comment. The Army's intelligence, security, and electronic warfare architecture for EAC intelligence units includes a "tailored" intelligence organization for each theater of operations. This EAC intelligence unit will be placed under the operational control of the Army Component commander both in peace and war. (This structure would have reduced the 3d Army G2's administrative and management problems.) In addition, organic multi-discipline MI units have been assigned to each corps and division. These units provide the commander with all-source collection assets that can focus on the commander's area of interest.

Observation. During the Lorraine Campaign, the 10th Reconnaissance Group tasked aerial photography, and reproduced prints since Army imagery interpretation detachments or the photo center didn't have an organic reproduction capability.

Comment. The 3d Army G2 formed the MI Battalion, Aerial Reconnaissance Support (MIBARS). This battalion was a self-sustaining TOE and was assigned one per field army. This function has now been incorporated into the EAC brigade at theater level. However, new technologies allow us to distribute soft-copy imagery to tactical commanders.

Observation. The requirement for CI personnel varied according to the phase and type of tactical operations. The G2 also noted that Counter-Intel-

ligence Corps (CIC) personnel were attached to Army and subordinate headquarters from a central CIC Command. The G2 recommended that CI personnel be assigned to and remain with appropriate headquarters to include Army level.

Comment. The CIC is no longer part of Army structure. In MI units at separate brigade, division, corps, and EAC, CI personnel are organic and directly responsive to the tactical commander.

The Ursano Study

Is there a true lesson learned here? Was Vietnam another opportunity to correct our past errors? Clearly, the answer is yes! But, are we doomed to repeat these errors? Perhaps not!!

After Vietnam, the Army attempted to evaluate the performance of its intelligence function during that war. The results of that evaluation are contained in **The Intelligence and Organization Stationing Study (IOSS)**.

The IOSS is commonly called the **Ursano Study**, because General James Ursano headed the investigative team. What did the study conclude? In part, it validated the observations of the Lorraine Campaign's 3d Army G2. The study found that—

- ☐ An appropriate organizational structure of intelligence units had not been developed.
- ☐ Intelligence was fragmented and "stove-piped" within organizational structures and not properly focused on the commander's immediate needs.
- ☐ Intelligence assets must be organic to the commander to maximize their effectiveness.
- ☐ Intelligence is an all-source function and organic intelligence units must be all source at tactical level and tailored at EAC level.

As a direct result of the **Ursano Study**, the Army—

- ☐ Deactivated the Army Security Agency.
- ☐ Formed the Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).
- ☐ Formed a new series of TOE—the 34-XX series.
- ☐ Developed the CEWI concept.
- ☐ Placed career intelligence officers in battalion, brigade, and ACR S2 positions, and division and corps G2 positions.

Now that's progress!! Right?

Not so fast! Why do you think we didn't implement the battlefield proven and documented observations of our 3d Army G2 until 30 years later? Remember, we learned the same lessons over again in Korea and Vietnam. Perhaps it had something to do with the Army's downsizing between wars. Perhaps it had to do with a difficulty in appreciating the value of intelligence in peacetime. Perhaps it had to do with the budget. Or perhaps

you and I have not convinced our commanders that American soldiers must never again be sent into the **first battle** without the protection provided by timely, accurate intelligence—collected, analyzed, and disseminated by intelligence professionals.

The challenge is clear. We must all be students of history. We must not only avoid our predecessors' mistakes but must also look into the future. We must be committed to the philosophy that "nothing is forever." And if it "ain't broke" we have time to make the fixes and changes necessary to ensure that it "don't break!!"

When the wisdom of the **Ursano Study** was implemented, we, as a nation, were committed to winning the Cold War. In that battle, assets were dedicated to DOD and the U.S. Army in a manner not seen in this country in peacetime before. The

future will be different; the challenges will be difficult as our Army is once again downsized (rightsized) to meet new world order threats. The challenge is clear: Provide our Army with the correct intelligence support to win the next battle.

Being Always Out Front requires vigilance and dedication as well as knowledge of the past. So, as we develop new solutions for MI, it is prudent that we do so with a historical perspective in mind.

If you want a new idea, read an old book.

Colonel Robert J. Covalucci is the commander, U.S. Army Intelligence School-Fort Devens. He is a graduate of the University of Massachusetts. Key assignments include Commander, U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Huachuca; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School; Commander, 533d MI Battalion, 3d Armor Division; and Province Senior Intelligence Advisor, Vietnam, 1968. During a second tour in Vietnam, he served as the Intelligence and Operations Officer, Joint Personnel Recovery Center for Southeast Asia.

Back to the Future

by Colonel Robert J. Covalucci

As we look to the future, it is important to look at the forest and not get trapped by the trees. The changes taking place around us are of revolutionary proportion. We must keep them in perspective and make appropriate decisions as we chart our course. While some may fear the future, those of stout heart view it as an opportunity to steer this generation through a necessary course change.

How complex will it be for the next generation? What are the prospects that the new world order will allow people to carry on world commerce and political intercourse in a spirit of cooperation and normalcy? How can we balance the nations of "have nots" with those of wealth and prosperity? How will we deal with national pride and the growing fear of external competition? We must answer these questions and a host more as we interface with a quickly changing world.

What impact will these changes have on our military complex? What will be the nature of Army Intelligence in this organization? We must study these questions in light of a downsized Army that is still looking for clear national policy and strategy direction. Our military's organization and design must be built on a bedrock of national strategy and objectives. As our commander-in-chief welds together policy and strategy, we must develop options that can be quickly implemented to accomplish our mission.

The **Ursano Study** resulted in far reaching changes in Army Intelligence and set the stage for major force structure and organizational changes. It created multidiscipline units organic to separate brigades/ACRs, divisions, and corps; it also recognized that field commanders must control the intelligence assets they need to execute their missions.

Ursano Study findings were not the discovery of the intelligence Rosetta stone. Since World War II, G2s and commanders noted and recommended solutions for the same problems the study uncovered. Specifically, the 3d Army G2 in his after action report from the Lorraine

Campaign recommended almost every change that emerged from the **Ursano Study**.

What changes have already occurred in Army Intelligence? In the 5-year budget in 1982, we had 17,500 spaces for the tactical intelligence mission. This included an MI unit of company, battalion, or brigade size for each separate brigade/ACR, division, and corps in the Active Army. Additionally, a theater-specific INSCOM MI brigade was tailored for each theater commander. Those units were robust, multidiscipline, and appropriately equipped to support their supported command.

Technological advances and equipment modernization have allowed us to reduce our units' size while preserving mission integrity. The number and type of combat units remaining will drive the size of the MI Corps. But, more important, is the organization and mission capability of those MI units. It is imperative that these units have the intelligence capability commanders need to accomplish their missions.

Especially, with a smaller Army, we need to be committed to the continuation of an MI Branch. Not long ago, the U.S. Army's Intelligence mission was accomplished by detailed officers who served only brief periods in intelligence assignments. Not until 1962 was the Army Intelligence and Security (AIS) Branch established. The Branch was redesignated MI Branch in 1964. On July 1, 1987, Major General Julius Parker Jr. became the first chief of the MI Corps. This evolution in Army Intelligence highlights the need for a corps of intelligence professionals to serve field commanders.

In this time of change, we must not sacrifice this essential battlefield equalizer to maintain a less critical force structure in the Active Army. Intelligence is the key to our being ready for the **first battle** of the next conflict. Only timely and accurate intelligence can reduce to an acceptable level the risk commanders face in battle. The admonition to Army leadership and to the members of the U.S. Army MI Branch must be that we truly accept the lessons learned from past conflicts. At all costs, we must not allow ourselves to slip...

Back Into The Future!!

High Payoff Targets: When to Engage

by Captain Richard E. Nock

Editor's Note: The targeting triad turns HVTs into HPTs through wargaming. To structure the wargaming, Captain Nock used the "spider body" technique in the Decide Function of the targeting cycle. Time permitting, this is an excellent technique for wargaming HPTs.

Desert Storm's Intelligence and targeting successes were due largely to technological advances such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) and the modernization of Intelligence communications through the TROJAN SPIRIT system. Our intelligence system of systems can detect targets before and during battle. Still, someone has to decide which targets will further the commander's mission—these are called high payoff targets (HPTs). Then, someone has to decide **when** to engage the target during battle. But how do you determine when is the critical time to attack an HPT? This article discusses "spider body analysis," which proved to be an excellent technique in determining when to engage.

Staff Planning Process

During the staff planning process, the G2 and his staff determine high value targets (HVTs). An HVT is an "...enemy asset which, if interdicted, would be expected to contribute substantial degradation of an important enemy battlefield function."¹ HVTs are targets the G2 has determined are essential to the success of the enemy commander's mission. In other words, the G2 recommends where to hit the enemy so it will hurt him the most and cause him to lose the battle.

After the G2 section determines HVTs, the battle staff meets to wargame the friendly courses of action (COAs) against enemy COAs. During wargaming, the G2 nominates HVTs as HPTs for each friendly COA. An HPT is an HVT that must be acquired and successfully attacked in order for the friendly commander's mission to succeed.² The key to HPTs is that they are based on the friendly concept of operations and support the friendly force commander's scheme of maneuver.

The targeting triad consists of the G3, G2, and fire support officer (FSO). Together, they—

- ☐ Determine **when** the HVT is most critical to the friendly concept of operations.



- ☐ Analyze each HVT at critical places and times.
- ☐ Use this analysis to recommend the most critical time or window of engagement to attack the HVT. A critical time is when the enemy commander has no, or low, capability to react to the destruction of a valuable asset (HVT).

The targeting cycle has three stages—**Detect**, **Decide**, and **Deliver**. During the **Decide** function, the targeting triad determines **when** to engage a target. The targeting triad performs the **Decide** function in coordination with the wargaming step of the command estimate process.

The targeting triad follows doctrine to differentiate between the three categories of when—**immediate**, **as acquired**, or **planned**:

- ☐ **Immediate** targets must be attacked as soon as they're detected and our weapons systems can engage them. An example of an **immediate** target is nuclear delivery means.
- ☐ An **as acquired** target is engaged in the order that fire control receives it. The HPT list gives the priority of engagement.
- ☐ A **planned** target is one that is marked for future engagement as part of a larger plan, such as a suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) mission.³


After the category is determined, it is noted in the

when column of the attack guidance matrix (AGM).

Spider Body Analysis

In the spider body technique, the targeting triad analyzes an HVT at predetermined critical times on the battlefield. (See Figure 1.) At each place and time, the targeting triad makes a list of enemy

reactions to attack. This list becomes the legs of the spider. The body of the spider is the target. Reactions are what the enemy commander is capable of doing if we **Detect** and Interdict the HVT. The best time to attack an HVT is when the enemy commander has no, or few, reactions available to him.



POL effects are more long term and extensive than CLASS V effects, which are potentially more sudden, but vary according to weapon system and previous ammo expenditure.

Figure 1. ADA and POL spider body diagrams.

The spider body technique also allows the targeting triad to narrow the window of engagement further than current AGM doctrine permits. It refines the **when** of the AGM to a more specific window of engagement than **as acquired** or during a particular phase of an operation. By narrowing the window of engagement from **as acquired** to "Engage at target area of interest (TAI) 1 between N+1.5 and N+2 hours," an HPT can be engaged at the critical time to maximize our success.

How It Works

Let's examine how this works, using the decision support template and execution matrix shown in Figure 2.

The 139th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (GMRD) is defending along phase line (PL) GUN with the unlocated 131st Guards Tank Regiment (GTR) as the division reserve. The division is at 80 percent strength. We already know the 139th GMRD is critically short of fuel.

Our mission is: "9th ID attacks in zone NLT 080600 Dec 1993 to seize Objectives TIMEX and CLOCK, to control the river crossing sites at TAI 1 and 3 vicinity PL PISTOL, and to prevent the enemy from counterattacking to regain control of river crossing sites."

I will analyze two assets of air defense artillery (ADA) and combat service support (CSS) battlefield operating systems (BOSs) at three different times during our attack: The first time at N-Hour; the second, N+2; and the last, N+3 (PL PISTOL), before crossing the river. I will use SA-9/13's and division petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) supplies of the ADA and CSS BOSs, respectively.

N-Hour Analysis

As our attack starts, we must answer the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) of "Locate the 131 GTR and the unidentified independent tank battalion (ITB)." The PIR drive our HVT list.

First, analyze the spider body diagrams to determine the enemy commander's options if the two selected assets were interdicted now.

The SA-9/13's provide air defense for regimental command posts (CPs) and regimental artillery groups (RAGs). They are positioned to range the forward positions of the main battle area. TAI 6 is a templated covering force position. The SA-9/13's will not be deployed to range this position. In addition, if we engage this asset now, the enemy commander will know we have detected his RAG and regimental CP. If we choose to destroy the SA-9/13's now, he has time to relocate his RAG and CP, to realign his air defense coverage, to request support from

higher headquarters, or to task other assets to perform the air defense mission. All reactions cause us to go back to the **Detect** function of the targeting cycle without furthering the commander's mission. Our analysis shows that, because of the asset's location and our mission, this asset is not an HPT at N-Hour.

In the defense, POL supplies usually have low relative value. In this case, however, POL supplies have high relative value because they're in short supply. By interdicting now, we limit the enemy commander's reactions to our attack. Because he's low on fuel, he can postpone his counterattack, reallocate any fuel he has, or request more fuel from higher headquarters. The request takes time to answer and push fuel forward. Whatever the decision, by engaging the fuel sources at N-Hour, the enemy commander loses his battlefield agility.

So, at N-Hour, POL supplies are an HPT, due to the friendly mission and our ability to engage the target at the critical time—a time when the target has the highest value to our mission's success. The SA-9/13's are not an HPT at N-Hour because of their location based on our mission, and because the enemy commander has time to react to our attack.


N+2 Analysis

At N+2, "What is the reserve doing?" and "Will the enemy use chemicals to slow our advance?" are the commander's PIR. Let's analyze the spider body at this time.

All enemy reactions to our engagement involve repositioning or requesting support from higher headquarters. Repositioning takes time. By engaging the SA-9/13's now, we restrict the enemy commander's ability to launch chemicals from his RAG. Without air defense coverage of his RAG, we can immediately destroy his indirect fire weapons. This eliminates the threat of the enemy delivering chemical weapons by indirect fire. Also, the enemy's command and control (C²) is then vulnerable at a critical time when he's deciding whether to counterattack or to use chemicals.

ADA has a medium relative value in the defense; but this value increases to high when it is linked to the destruction of fire support (FS) and C². Both of these BOSs have high relative values in the defense. Thus, SA-9/13 air defense assets are an HPT at N+2 because they protect the more critical BOSs of FS and C². The destruction of air defense also supports the commander's operation, which is part of a SEAD mission supporting the planned close air support (CAS) attack at decision points (DPs) 1, 2, and 3.

At this point in the battle, the enemy counterat-



	H-8	H-HOUR	PL GUN	DPs 1,2,3	PL PISTOL	OBJECTIVES	PL SABER
INTEL	PIR LOCATE 131 GTR ID RIVER X-ING LOCATE BN / REGT RECON	JAM DIV/RECON INTEL ARTY NETS PIR LOCATE 131 GTR LOCATE UNIDENTIFIED ITB	PIR LOCATE DIV MAIN AND FWD CP LOCATE DIV FAAR	PIR IS RESERVE MOVING? IS USE OF CHEMICALS LIKELY? JAM DIV C ³ 131 GTR C ²	PIR. REINFORCING UNITS ENTERING SECTOR? ENEMY USE OF NUCLEAR? REAR AREA THREAT?		
MVR	RECON LD COORDINATE PASSAGE POINTS	ATTACK HELOS ON TAI 6	BEGIN FWD MOVEMENT OF RESERVE		BE PREPARED TO PASS RESERVE FORWARD	ATTACK HELOS EAST OF TIMEX	CONSOLIDATE ON OBJECTIVES SCREEN FORWARD
FS	DIV RECON NUKE/CHEM DELIVERY UNITS, DIV/REGT FDCs	MRLs, 152s 130s FUs, DIV RECON CFL PL PISTOL CUE RADARS SUPPRESS ADA IN SPT OF ATTACK HELOS	MRLs DIV FAARs DIV RECON	DP 1: ENGAGE TAI 1 DP 2: ENGAGE TAI 2 DP 3: ENGAGE TAI 3 CFL: PL SABER SUPPRESS ADA IN SPT OF CAS	DP 4: ENGAGE TAI 4 LOC, ATK HELOS; DIV MAIN + FWD CP	SUPPRESS ADA IN SPT OF ATK HELOS CUE RADARS	
AD	STATUS TIGHT/RED		STATUS FREE/RED	DP 1, 2, 3 TIGHT/RED			
MOB/ CMOB	ID OBSTACLES ID RIVER X-ING PRIORITY MOB/ CMOB			DP 1, 2, 3 RECON X-ING SITES AT TAIs 1, 2, 3			
NBC	ID CONTAMINATED AREAS WEST OF RIVER	MOPP 2	ID CONTAMINATED AREAS EAST OF RIVER				ESTABLISH DECON ON RIVER
CSS	PRIORITY RESUPPLY 313th BDE			MSR PRIORITY RESERVE AND FA RESUPPLY			REPOSITION BSAs FORWARD
C2	ESTABLISH RETRANS ON HIGH GROUND TO REAR		JUMP TAC CP FWD TO C ² RIVER X-ING	JUMP RETRANS TO PL GUN		JUMP MAIN FORWARD	
AVN				DP 1, 2, 3 ENGAGE TAIs 1, 2, 3 WITH CAS	DP 4: ENGAGE TAI 4 WITH CAS (JAAT?)		

Figure 2. Decision support template and execution matrix.

tack force will refuel and refit to accomplish its counterattack mission. Also, the counterattack may already be in progress. The enemy counterattack force will not need POL at N+2. Destroying POL supplies at N+2 will not further the commander's mission. Therefore, POL is not an HPT at N+2.

N + 3 Analysis

As explained earlier, at N+3, POL is not an HPT. However, if we have not detected or destroyed the SA-9/13's by N+3, they are still an HPT, based on the commander's intent to engage TAI 4 with CAS. In this case, we would have to conduct a SEAD mission, including interdicting enemy air defense assets along the aerial axis of advance, in the TAI 4 area.

Thus, the SA-9/13's are still an HPT at N+3. They remain an HPT from N+2 until we destroy them or until the helicopter attack of Objective TIMEX ends, before the maneuver force occupies. "N+2 to completion of the SEAD mission for TAI 4" should be entered in the remarks column of the AGM. This is the window of engagement. It is also the time when the target is an HPT.

There is an exception to the rule: nuclear assets or delivery means. Nuclear weapons are HPTs at all times and places on the battlefield because of their potential for mass destruction.

Conclusion

The intelligence officer must be involved in the targeting functions of **Decide**, **Detect**, and **Deliver**. Together, the targeting triad analyzes HVTs and determines the target's time and location and when it will become an HPT. This increases the success of the mission and conserves the commander's limited indirect fire assets.

According to one field artillery general, Major

General Fred F. Matry, for division commanders, all targets engaged should be HPTs. He based this on the limited number of indirect fire assets the division controls.⁴ We can take this one step further and propose that all HPTs should be planned targets. HPTs should be planned to a window of engagement analyzed to be the most critical time to maximize our commander's mission success and minimize our enemy's reactions.

An HVT becomes an HPT based on mission, critical time, and location. The targeting triad uses spider body analysis to determine the critical times of the battle. After analyzing enemy reactions to target engagement, the triad selects a window of engagement. The window of engagement must maximize our mission while degrading the enemy's. We must also be able to engage the HVT during the selected window of engagement. It is during the window of engagement that the HVT becomes an HPT. Remember, an HVT becomes an HPT based primarily on time, mission, and our ability to engage the HVT at its location.

Endnotes

1. LTC Mark C. Lewonoski, "Information War," *Air War College Research Report*, Air University, USAF, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1991, 13.
2. FM 6-20-10, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process*, G-1.
3. FM 6-20-40, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy)*, 6-2.
4. FM 6-20-10, 2-9.

The ADA and POL spider body diagrams are extracted from the *Fire Support Mission Area Analysis*, Vol II, Appendix C.


Captain Richard E. Nock is assigned to the Battle Coordination Element J3, 8th Army, Korea. Other key assignments include electronic warfare platoon leader and XO, C Company, 109 MI Battalion; and assistant S2, 1st Brigade, 9th ID. Before attending OCS, Captain Nock served as a Russian interrogator with the 18th MI Battalion, 66th MI Brigade, Germany. He has a bachelor's degree from Penn State and a master's degree from the University of Southern California.



Air IPB and the BCTP Experience

by Captain Shawn C. Weed

"Kill enemy air where they are likely to attack." This was the bottom line of the 3-62 Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Battalion (Vulcan/Stinger) commander's intent for Warfighter 92-6 Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). But for the commander to place effective air defense assets to stop the enemy air threat right in their vapor tracks, he first needed an accurate picture of the enemy air commander's battle plan from his S2.



The plan that helped drive our counterair operations was pieced together through the meticulous use of the air intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. And judging by our success—97 of 214 enemy aircraft destroyed (virtually eliminating their offensive air capability) with no significant damage to division protection priorities—it seems the process worked.

We began our initial estimate of the situation by analyzing information received from XVIII Corps through the assistant division air defense officer (ADADO) and the division G2. Using this analysis, we defined the—

- ☐ ADA battalion's areas of operations and interest.
- ☐ Ground situation.
- ☐ Enemy's aircraft inventory.
- ☐ Terrain and weather overview.
- ☐ Probable division mission.

Together, these comprised the basics we needed to begin the five-step IPB process defined in FM 34-130, **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**:

1. Battlefield Area Evaluation.
2. Weather Evaluation.
3. Terrain Evaluation.
4. Threat Evaluation.
5. Threat Integration.

Editor's Note: In FM 34-130 (to be published Dec 93) IPB is a four-step process: 1. "Define the Battlefield Environment" replaces Battlefield Area Evaluation; 2. "Evaluate the Battlefield's Effects" replaces Weather Evaluation and Terrain Evaluation; 3. "Evaluate the Threat" replaces Threat Evaluation; and 4. "Determine Enemy Courses of Action (COAs)" replaces Threat Integration. The concepts Captain Weed presents, however, remain valid.

Battlefield Area Evaluation

From the start, we worked on the assumption that the enemy (in this case the *Marcalan* in a Latin American scenario) would use their aircraft to support the ground effort. To understand how the enemy would use his aircraft against us, we needed to know what the *Marcalan* ground commander's plan would be at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.



By putting ourselves in his place, we found that his division area of operations was not the main effort, but rather, an economy of force mission whose goal was to protect the flank to his main effort defense to the west. Based on this, we could make

assumptions as to how the *Marcalan* air force would allocate sorties to support his ground defense (All of the enemy's assets, both fixed wing and rotary, belonged to the air force, except a large contingent of Mi-6's and Mi-8's that belonged to Special Operations Command.)

Weather and Terrain Evaluation

The next step was to analyze weather and terrain from both ground and air perspectives, both red and blue. We looked for things we or the enemy could or could not do because of weather and terrain. Some significant factors emerged from this analysis:

- ☐ Rugged terrain supports infiltration, but only limited mechanized and armor operations.
- ☐ Key ground terrain is high ground overlooking choke points along main areas of approach. Key air terrain is likely forward area rearming and refueling point locations (identified by large open areas), regional airfields, and aerial choke points along projected air avenues of approach (AAAs)
- ☐ Terrain provided covered and concealed rotary-wing avenues, but precluded the use of fixed-wing, high-speed, low-level avenues in sector.
- ☐ Both red and blue ADA systems would suffer from terrain masking.

For terrain analysis, we used several tools: A detailed Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) on a 1:50,000 scale; bridge data from the engineers; and a variety of computer-based terrain products from the G2 (Because of software integration problems with our lap-top computer, we had no organic computer-based terrain capability.)

One problem we had from the start of the planning cycle was how to look at the entire division area of operations at once. From the division-rear boundary to the limit of advance was close to 150 kilometers and there were no 1:100,000 maps available. After several variations, we finally decided on a huge map board 7 feet high by 6 feet wide with 35 map sheets used for predeployment planning and future field operations.

The first three phases of the IPB cycle yielded five products:

- ☐ The MCOO.
- ☐ Rotary-wing AAAs with landing zones.
- ☐ Forward AAAs with drop zones.
- ☐ Line-of-sight analysis.
- ☐ Visible area plots from computer-based terrain.

Soon, we got a feel for where we were going to fight and how weather and terrain in the areas of operations and interest would affect both friendly and enemy operations. We then turned our attention

to the threat, and evaluated him in terms of what he had, where it was, and what it could do.

Threat Evaluation

We began to evaluate the threat from three angles:

1. We looked at his ground forces.
2. Where they were on the battlefield.
3. What their mission was.

Once again, the third point is crucial because we worked on the assumption that the enemy would synchronize his air assets to support his ground force mission. The fact that the *Marcalan* air force did not have the capability to conduct an independent air campaign supported this assumption.

We looked at other ground threats, including—

- ☐ Nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities.
- ☐ Tactical ballistic missile inventory.
- ☐ Artillery systems.
- ☐ Special operations and unconventional forces.
- ☐ Terrorists and insurgent forces.

We had to know how these would affect ADA battalion ground soldiers or how the enemy might use his air assets: for example, using Mi-6's or Mi-8's to insert or resupply special operations forces in the rear area. Our main source for intelligence on the ground threat was the G2.

We also analyzed the enemy's ADA weapon system capabilities. We templated the location of those assets based on the ground force situational template the G2 gave us. We, in turn, provided our analysis to the G2 because the division sees the ADA battalion as the subject matter experts in both air IPB and enemy ADA analysis.

Now that the ground picture was beginning to come into focus, we evaluated the enemy air threat. To ensure speed and accuracy, we followed this sequence to assess enemy—

1. Air order of battle: where are the air assets, to whom do they belong?
2. Special operations order of battle: forces that might use air assets for transport and resupply.
3. Air assets by mission type.
4. Air asset capabilities, including—
 - Total number.
 - Performance: speed hi/lo and with weapons, ceiling and runway requirements.
 - Armament: what type weapons and their performance, ordnance release characteristics, electronic countermeasures.
 - Range: both with and without combat loads.
 - Capabilities and remarks: characteristics such as day or night, look down or shoot down, navigational radars, troop carrying capacities.
5. Sortie generation capabilities at various staging

bases.

6. Operational and survival rates, by mission and aircraft.

7. Enemy air commander's intent.

8. Air force objectives: tactical, operational, strategic.

9. Air asset command and control systems for both rotary and fixed wing (forward operating bases, forward area rearming and refueling points [FARRPs], vectoring designation targeting points, remote navigational points, forward aligning areas, forward air controllers, and others as appropriate).

10. Tactics and flight profiles based on air doctrinal templates, by mission type.

Threat Integration

After we completed ground and air evaluation of the threat, one major question remained: How would the enemy fight? The answer to this question lies in IPB's final step—threat integration. Analysts use all of this collective analysis and input from the G2 on possible enemy ground COAs to develop the air COAs to support them.

For example, for this operation the enemy's most probable COA was to defend in depth along the main ground avenue of approach with both light and mechanized forces. We took this situational template and then time-phased how the enemy would support this type of defense with his available air assets. We used an overlay with an accompanying sequencing chart that outlined in detail where and what type air forces would be committed, how they would fly, and when they would fly.

We repeated the process for the enemy's most dangerous COA—a counterattack with both mechanized and light forces. These air avenues, with accompanying drop and landing zones and postulated C² nodes, were combined onto another overlay. This became the air situational template.

We then looked for points on the map that, if observed, would confirm or deny the projected enemy air COA or give warning to yet another. We passed these ground and air named areas of interest (NAIs) to the division's collection manager to be incorporated into the division's reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. This became the event template.

One of the problems with this was that we had no organic assets to look at our NAIs. We had to rely on high-to-medium altitude air defense (HIMAD) radars and airborne warning and control system coverage to provide intelligence on those areas. Only about half of our ground NAIs were covered since they coincided with the division's. Assets such as long-range surveillance detachments or special operations forces were not tasked to look specifically at

our NAIs.

One important lesson learned is that ADA scouts could cover some of our own NAIs. The ADA battalion would not have had to rely solely on information gathered by assets outside of its own organization. Unfortunately, we had not practiced using ADA scouts.

With the enemy mosaic just about complete, we began to look at what actions we, as an ADA battalion, could take to meet the commander's intent—"Kill enemy air." The decision support matrix (DSM) and the template that accompanies it would lead us to the answer.

Decision Support Template

The decision support template (DST) was based on the event template with some key additions—decision points (DPs) and targeted areas of interest (TAIs). These graphically show points in space and time where decisions and actions are synchronized to best thwart the enemy's plan.

We placed DPs at a point where activity (or possibly inactivity) at an NAI indicates an enemy action such as an air assault into the division-rear or a reconnaissance screen across the forward line of own troops. These DPs are linked to a combat action at a TAI. For example, we see two MiG 21's at an NAI moving across the enemy frontline trace. Soon after, we make a decision to activate a weapons free zone (WFZ) so the MiG 21's can be engaged at a TAI. In this case, the TAI and the WFZ are collocated. It is the accompanying DSM that outlines the specific decisions and actions to be taken at a DP.

Doctrine governing the DSM and what events should trigger what actions is refined for maneuver forces, but is still evolving for ADA units. There seems to be two schools of thought. One ties decisions and actions to the immediate tactical situation (such as reorienting primary target lines or activating WFZs). The other looks at big picture changes in enemy intent, such as commitment of a counterattack force, which drives a decision to task organize to meet the changing situation. Each has its pros and cons, and the answer is probably a hybrid of the two. Initially, our DST/DSM reflected the former.

Once we brainstormed, wargamed, and refined our DST/DSM and intelligence estimate, we went to print and got the word out through briefings and products. We briefed every player at least once, from the private first class to the battalion commander. We briefed some battery commanders and liaison officers so many times they probably could have served on the *Marcalan* tourism board. But it paid dividends because they had a firm grasp of the

overall situation.

We also disseminated a number of products to help principle players in their own planning. These included—


- ☐ The Intelligence annex to the order (estimate, R&S plan, and country study).
- ☐ An enemy ADA reference packet.
- ☐ A Data Pack, a 70-page, pocket-sized reference book containing almost everything about the battlefield area and enemy, both ground and air.
- ☐ Overlays and templates.

This, then, concluded our predeployment intelligence preparation. Now, the stage was set for the even more challenging task of providing tactical intelligence during the combat phases of the division's operations.

Tactical Intelligence

Currently, doctrine outlining tactical ADA intelligence operations is vague. So we tried to base our field operations on common sense and what we had seen work (or not work) at other units. Our trip to the 101st's 2-44 ADA Battalion was particularly helpful. Experience with the Infantry was also a great asset. It constantly reminded us to look not only skyward, but also at the ground action and to analyze potential air COAs relative to what the enemy's ground forces were trying to accomplish.

Physically, the battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC) consisted of four Standard Integrated Command Post (SICP) modules arranged in a square (see drawing). The S1, S2, and Air Battle Management Operations Center (ABMOC) vehicles



were booted in. The S2 and the ABMOC sections were collocated in one SICP, the S1/S4 formed the administrative/logistic operations center in another, and the S3 had its own SICP tent. We used the fourth SICP for plans and occasional briefings.

Once set up and operational, the tactical intelligence system continued the IPB process with a change of focus from research and postulation to the mechanics of finding out the enemy's air battle plan. We operated off three maps:

- ☐ The monster 1:50,000 map in the briefing tent which had the big picture MCOO, DST, recent significant events, and current enemy situation.
- ☐ A 1:50,000 map which paralleled the ABMOC's with the DST, enemy situation, recent significant events, and a 6-hour (depending on volume) track summary.
- ☐ A 1:250,000 map, which again paralleled the ABMOC's, showed friendly graphics and track summary.

The S2 section's tactical function was fourfold:

1. To postulate future air COAs based on analysis of the ground activity provided by the G2. (We received/distributed intelligence summaries [INTSUMs] every 6 hours.)
2. To confirm/deny/modify our estimates of what the enemy air would do through analysis of flight track activity and spot reports.
3. To identify and nominate specific targets for destruction (forward operating bases, forward area rearm and refueling points, etc.) through the ADADO and the division's targeting cell.
4. To maintain and disseminate key information in the form of battle books and our own graphic INTSUMs.

Tracking the enemy ground situation, as laid out for us by the G2, was key in developing what we thought was the enemy's most likely and dangerous air COAs. As the enemy continued with his battle plan we could postulate—based on his likely objectives, force allocation, and rate of march—when and where he might deploy certain types of aircraft to support his attack. Once this information was displayed graphically, we would use the tracks from the ABMOC to either confirm or modify our estimate.

One example of how this worked was with the enemy aerial reconnaissance. We originally postulated that the enemy would use both fixed- and rotary-wing assets to conduct reconnaissance along the border and likely axes of advance. However, the tracks we received showed that the enemy was actually conducting an aerial screen across his frontline trace (about 10 to 15 kilometers south of the border). Based on this, we modified our

estimate of how the enemy would use his air assets. This helped us later as the enemy's force disposition changed.

The tracks also revealed that, initially, the enemy tried to go deep, just as we had envisioned. However, he suffered heavy losses in the attempt and altered his tactics to close air support missions against targets at the forward edge of the battle area. While still risky, this approach was not quite as dangerous.

The ABMOC section also provided our best intelligence on where the enemy's fixed- and rotary-wing assets were staging operations from. During our terrain and threat doctrine evaluation, we situationally templated those places we expected the enemy to use as FARRPs and forward operating bases (FOBs). (The open areas needed for these sites stood out in the convoluted *Marcalan* terrain.) But the tracks really were the factor that confirmed or denied our situation template.

Based on tracks from the ABMOC, we were able to send the ADADO and the G2 track evidence of enemy air activity at certain areas. We were able to either cue an intelligence collection asset for further target resolution or to nominate the targeting area through the ADADO and the division's targeting cell.

The problem with this system was the turnaround time from when we noted activity to when the target was fired upon. Stationary targets—such as fixed wing, fast mover staging bases (military airfields)—can be attacked as planned targets in a large time frame. But for successful interdiction of temporary targets (FARRPs or FOBs), quick action is crucial once we acquire them.

Eyes on the objective (for example, ADA scouts) might have sped up this process by providing real-time intelligence and targeting data at NAIs. But we're still weighing the feasibility of such a detachment. While finding and destroying enemy air assets on the ground is the best case (we are able to kill them before they destroy divisional assets), it is the exception rather than the rule.

Therefore, to plan effective use of ADA assets, it is imperative that all planners have an accurate, up-to-date air picture (event template) at their fingertips. Our INTSUMs provided this. But producing and disseminating them to the ADADO, G2, and supported units were the most time-consuming and frustrating part of the entire air IPB process. Sending the completed report to the different stations was also time-consuming, requiring as much as 2 hours of FAX time for each INTSUM!

All told, we had nine separate locations (from division-main to the supported brigade TOCs) who

received our INTSUM every 6 hours. Our INTSUM included—

- ☐ A short summary of the ground situation.
- ☐ Significant activities over the last 6 hours (engagements, sightings).
- ☐ What aircraft were left in the enemy inventory.
- ☐ An analysis paragraph.
- ☐ A graphic summary of the tracks drawn on a miniature of the area of operations.

The most difficult part was the accounting. It seemed every time we got ready to send out an INTSUM, we couldn't get the numbers to match what the S2, ADADO, the division-rear, or whomever had. Then we'd have to go back and tediously account for each destroyed or damaged aircraft. While this got better as the battle went on, we never did get the number-crunching down to a reasonable degree of efficiency.

In retrospect, the consensus is that the S3 should have been the "keeper of the truth," since he gets the engagement reports the attrition figures are based on first. Often, inaccurate or duplicate engagement reports caused our numbers problem.

But for the G2, liaison officers, and ADA commanders it was worth the effort as it gave them an up-to-date synopsis of the air war in an easily usable format. For the G2/S2, it showed a portion of the threat often overlooked in the traditional maneuver intelligence cycle. The graphic track summary was particularly useful. Supported commanders could see in an instant the pattern of the enemy sorties and make air coverage adjustments accordingly. In one instance, the ADADO was able to use the track summaries in a bid to get additional HIMAD support to counterair attacks in our sector.

Overall, the 3d Battalion, 62d ADA, did exceptionally well in living up to the commander's intent to, "kill the enemy air." This required not only a thorough predeployment IPB, but also a continuous revision of our assessments based on the tactical situation. It also required continuous coordination with the division G2 and supported unit fire support planners to input offensive counterair nominations in the targeting process.

But our efforts paid off, and it was air IPB that helped bring the enemy air picture into focus to make killing them that much easier.

Captain Weed is currently assigned to the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. He previously served with the U.S. Army Parachute Team at Fort Bragg, the Golden Knights, and the 10th Mountain Division.

Intelligence and Aviation: A Strong Future

by Captain David B. Kneafsey

These are exciting times for the soldiers in Career Field 15C35, Intelligence Qualified Aviator, which is currently experiencing significant and, hopefully, lasting improvements. Now, more than ever, MI and aviation branches (at PERSCOM) and proponent offices (at TRADOC service schools) are working together on 15C35 accession, training, distribution, and utilization issues. This article addresses these issues and the progress being made; however, its greater purpose is to inform the MI Corps of the varied skills and resources the 15C35's possess.

Accession

Officers can be accessed for the 15C35 program at one of three points in their career:

- ☐ During the Aviation Officer Basic Course (AOBC) and Initial Entry Rotary-Wing (IERW) training.
- ☐ Before an aviation officer attends the MI Officer Advanced Course (MIOAC).
- ☐ When an MI officer requests a transfer to the 15C program.

After these MI officers pass aviation flight physicals and aircraft qualifications, they will receive a mandatory functional area of 35, MI Officer. In terms of actual personnel, approximately 7 aviation lieutenants and 38 aviation/MI captains are accessed annually.


Training

Intelligence qualified aviators receive the same officer training as MI Branch Detail officers, including MI Officer Transition Course and MIOAC. After 15C35 officers complete these courses, some are selected to attend the Fixed-Wing Multi-Engine Qualification Course (FWMEQC) at Fort Rucker, AL, and the Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA) Qualification Course at Fort Huachuca.

Remember, being a "15C35" does not automatically equate to being a fixed-wing (FW) aviator. Current training requirements indicate that only 55 percent of 15C35 positions are fixed wing and 45 percent are rotary wing (RW).

The true focus of the 15C35 career program is to produce intelligence qualified aviators who are professionally competitive as both aviators and intelligence officers—not to produce fixed-wing pilots. Typical fixed-wing positions include platoon leader and staff officer in aerial exploitation battalions. Similar 15C35 rotary-wing assignments include S2 in an aviation battalion, S2 in a combat aviation brigade, and a QUICKFIX platoon leader.

The 15C35 Career Diagram (below) shows typical entry points as well as the various training skills 15C35's may possess. It also shows the utilization



tour 15C35's serve when they complete MIOAC and any required SEMA training. After this tour, and any branch qualification assignments, intelligence qualified aviators serve in either 15C35 or functional area 35 positions until they reach lieutenant colonel. This path will ensure that intelligence qualified aviators are competitive as both MI and aviation officers. As such, they can successfully compete for 15C35 battalion commands.

Currently, there are no O-6 15C35 authorizations. Thus, the intelligence qualified aviator career "peaks" at the O-5 level. At this point, 15C35's must opt for either a pure aviation or a pure MI assignment. Yet, due to the highly competitive records of 15C35's, their selection rate for O-6 is actually above average for the Army.

Distribution and Utilization

MI and aviation proponent offices are working together on 15C35 distribution and utilization agreements. One such issue, is "gate time."

AR 600-135, Aviation Career Incentive Pay, states: "In essence, Army aviators must accrue different amounts of operational flying duty (tallied in years and months) in order to receive Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) during assignments to non-flying positions. For example, the first significant 'gate' is at an aviator's 12th year of aviation service." Specifically, "an officer qualified for aviation service who has performed at least 6 years of operational flying duty upon completion of 12 years of aviation service, is entitled to continuous ACIP for the first 18 years of aviation service."

Although aviation OAC students have received gate time credit since October 1990, MIOAC aviator students are not yet receiving this recognition. OCMI is recommending full gate time credit; but MI, aviation, and DA proponent offices are also staffing other options.

Intelligence qualified aviators are vital members of the intelligence team; yet they are only beginning to be fully utilized as key intelligence qualified aviators. MI commanders and staff officers must understand the skills their 15C35's possess. It is imperative that we incorporate these officers into

our warfighting and MI professional development programs.

Future Prospects

In terms of growth, the future looks bright:


- ☐ All MI battalion and brigade precommand courses, MIOACs, and SEMA courses include 15C35 career program briefings. The briefings help educate present and future MI senior leadership on the challenges and vitality inherent in this specialty.
- ☐ Critical feedback and MI Corps field input have been incorporated into subsequent quarterly SEMA video-tele conferences. These are held between branch proponents at Forts Rucker, Monroe, and Huachuca.
- ☐ Either Fort Huachuca or Fort Rucker hosts periodic 15C35 seminars to mutually expand the IEW horizons and potential of our branches.

One of the most progressive aspects of the 15C35 career field is reflected in changes in the SEMA aircraft. For example, with the drawdown, most OV-1D Mohawk pilots will transition to RC-12 GUARDRAIL systems. Training for the RC-12K/N (GUARDRAIL Common Sensor) system will begin at Fort Huachuca in October, bringing both aircraft qualification and IEW system training to Fort Huachuca.

This dual qualification involving the aircraft and its IEW system is a milestone for the Home of Military Intelligence. Consequently, officers and warrant officers who become qualified as RC-12K/N pilots, will receive a new additional skill identifier—F4.

As we work on these issues, your insight and experience would be helpful. Send your comments to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, ATTN: ATZS-MI (15C35), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613; or call DSN: 821-1180/1181/1182

Captain Kneafsey is currently attending CGSOC. He is a graduate of the University of Scranton and has a master's degree in European History. Previous assignments include battalion S2, brigade S2, Intelligence Center Instructor, and professional development officer.



CMF-98 Restructure Concept



By Chief Warrant Officer 3 John P. Root

The MI Proponent has tasked the U.S. Army Intelligence School-Devens (USAISD) to review current SIGINT disciplines in CMF 98 for possible consolidation or deletion. Under consideration are 98D, Emitter Location Identifier; 98H, Morse Interceptor; 98J, Noncommunications Interceptor/Analyst; and 98K, Non-Morse Interceptor/Analyst.

Some of the changes driving this initiative are—

- ☐ The evolving threat.
- ☐ Current and projected changes in tactical collection equipment.
- ☐ NSA Deputy Director of Operations guidance on future requirements for a multitasked collector in both Morse and non-Morse.
- ☐ INSCOM's future SIGINT architecture.
- ☐ The need to create a viable personnel management and training structure to support a downsized force.
- ☐ The need to steer away from narrow specialization in order to exploit applications of advanced technologies.

The evolving threat is based on two assumptions. First, the conventional threat (including mainstay Morse Code and voice communications as well as traditional bauded and data systems) will continue into the 21st century. Second, the communications revolution will include a wide variety of advanced modulation techniques. These include cellular telephone, fax and modem communications, complex global networking, commercial encryption, a red/blue/grey mix, and increasingly affordable and commercially available hardware.

The Intelligence System of Systems concept and capabilities require a more balanced intelligence structure. Evolving systems technology encompasses both MI and INSCOM new concepts, remote exploitation to support conus-based military forces, and tactical common sensor architecture. But most important, new systems capabilities exceed current operator capabilities.

USAISD conducted a field site survey to determine if current and future system's architecture and mission requirements can be supported by the restructure and partial consolidation of MOSs 98D, 98H, 98K, and 98J into one or more redesigned MOSs. The proposed restructure looks like this:

- ☐ 98H, Conventional Signals Interceptor, will

collect, locate, and report HF Morse and HF/VHF/UHF non-Morse communication signals from developed/fielded systems.

- ☐ 98J, Nonconventional Signals Interceptor/Analyst, will collect, locate, perform signals analysis, and report on new, advanced, or unresolved COMINT, ELINT, and other signals.
- ☐ 98C, SIGINT Analyst, will perform all current tasks plus ELINT analysis and data base development and maintenance, with concentration on ELINT EOB and an expanded role in current 98J EOB billets.
- ☐ 98G, Voice Interceptor (Language Interceptor/Exploiter), will collect, locate, and report all plain text voice, and exploit languages from any communication source.
- ☐ 98 D, Emitter Locator/Identifier, and 98K, Non-Morse Interceptor/Analyst, will be eliminated as separate MOSs.

The proposed training strategy is to use existing training locations and capabilities for 98H, but to train 98J at the Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, while importing existing training from Pensacola, NSA, and Goodfellow Air Force Base, as required. We are addressing four levels of training development: entry-level resident training, transitional training, intermediate training (functional/BNCO), and advanced training (functional/ANCO).

Four basic rules will guide a redistribution of billets (authorizations only):

- ☐ 98H will remain 98H.
- ☐ 98D will convert to 98H.
- ☐ 98J will remain 98J (there is a study underway to determine the feasibility of converting some 98J EOB billets [EPDS/ETUT] to 98C).
- ☐ 98K will convert as follows: ASI M7/K2 to 98J; ASI U1 withdrawn (because of various draw-downs, this skill is no longer required as an independent ASI and will be taught at the apprentice level to MOS 98H); National System Sites to 98J; and all others to 98H.


Proposed effective date for resident entry level training (AIT) is October 1, 1994; and June 1, 1995, for transition effective date. Training materials will be available for transitional training in January.

We will issue monthly updates to the cryptologic community for this restructure. For comments or questions, contact CW3 John P. Root, U.S. Army intelligence School-Devens, DSN 256-3435.

The Changing Face of Fort Huachuca

by Colonel Robert B. Mangold
and First Lieutenant Brent A. York

Last December, we sent the following electronic mail message to Major General Paul E. Menoher Jr., Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca: "Sir, recommend we consider a formal ceremony of some kind on February 8, 1993, to commemorate start-up of the first signals intelligence (SIGINT) training course transferred from Fort Devens. Will take lead if you desire." Little did we realize what lay ahead of us when we received a clear mission type response from the Chief of our Corps: "Do it."



Our ceremony turned out to be a grand 3-day celebration, from February 6 to 8, that not only commemorated the start-up of the first SIGINT course transferred from Fort Devens, but truly recognized now and forever more Fort Huachuca as the single home of Military Intelligence. Under the Base Realignment and Closure Acts of 1988 and 1991, all intelligence training done at the Intelligence School-Devens will be transferred to Fort Huachuca by FY 95.

To accommodate this increased mission, \$200 million in construction will be completed or underway by the end of FY 93. Another \$142 million of postwide construction is planned for completion by FY 96. For the Intelligence Center this has meant 7 new multistory barracks buildings that can accommodate more than 1,700 soldiers, 2 dining facilities, 2 state-of-the-art instructional buildings with over 232,000 square feet, and a large maintenance facility. Also under construction is an NCO Academy and an additional instructional facility. By 1996 we will add an Operations Building and additional soldier support facilities.

The weekend's events included an open house for the public on Saturday, February 6. On Sunday, we sponsored an open golf match at the Fort Huachuca Golf Course, an open house for invited

officials, and the commanding general's reception. Instructors from the new SIGINT/Electronic Warfare Department conducted guided tours of our new instructional buildings, barracks, dining facilities, and maintenance facilities.

For many, this was the first glimpse they had of how today's soldier is billeted and messed. The barracks house two soldiers per room with four soldiers sharing one bathroom area. The barracks also have a spacious, well-equipped dayroom for relaxation. Future plans call for several AAFES facilities to be located within the academic complex, providing shopping, laundry, and dry cleaning services.



A reception hosted by Major General and Mrs. Paul E. Menoher Jr. was the highlight of the weekend's activities, followed by a ribbon cutting and dedication ceremony on February 8. Over 300 civilian and military dignitaries attended the reception as well as a cross-section of students from both the Basic and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Courses and the Basic and Advanced Officer Courses.

A historical presentation and a concert by the Intelligence Center's own 36th U.S. Army Band were two highlights of Sunday evening's reception. The historical presentation detailed the histories of Forts Holabird and Ritchie, Md., and Fort Devens, Mass. For the older generation, memories were relived; and the younger generation learned where we came from.

Dedicated and opened for use on February 8 was our first new instructional facility, Nicholson Hall. This building is a state-of-the-art instructional facility with over 76,000 square feet.

For those who attended our celebration, the feeling of pride in our Corps reached new heights. When you see us, you too will shine.

A special thanks to the Huachuca Scout for background information and to Paul H. Wells for the photographs.

"A Dream Come True" Schedule of Events

Saturday, February 6, 1993,
9 a.m. to 1 p.m. Nicholson Hall

Sunday, February 7, 1993,
4 p.m. to 6 p.m. Nicholson Hall

6 p.m. to 8 p.m.
Alvarado Hall

Monday, February 8, 1993,
9 a.m. Nicholson Hall

New Academic Complex Open House: Nicholson Hall, Friedman Hall, Koch Barracks, Yardley Dining Facility, and 111th MI Brigade Maintenance Facility



New Academic Complex Open House

Commanding General's Reception hosted by Major General and Mrs. Paul E. Mencher Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, the Home of Military Intelligence

Ceremony to commemorate "A DREAM COME TRUE" marking the first class day for intelligence training courses being transferred from Fort Devens, Mass.; inactivation of the 112th Military Intelligence Brigade; and dedication of Nicholson Hall in memory of Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. Nicholson Jr., United States Army

11:30 a.m.
La Hacienda NCO Club

Association of the United States Army Luncheon. Guest Speaker: U.S. Senator Dennis DeConcini (Arizona), Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence



1. **Willoughby Barracks.** Major General Charles A. Willoughby was the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, for General Douglas MacArthur throughout the Pacific Campaigns of World War II. Willoughby accompanied MacArthur to Japan and served as his senior intelligence officer in the Army of Occupation and in the U.S. Army Far East Command.

2. **Kapp Barracks.** Private First Class Stanley W. Kapp, a radio intercept operator in the Philippines during the Japanese invasion, remained at his post until his mission could no longer be accomplished. He then helped lead a heroic 6-month odyssey through the islands until he was captured by the Japanese in September 1942. Kapp died in captivity in 1944.

3. **Revere Barracks.** Paul Revere, American Revolutionary hero.

4. **Sherr Barracks.** Colonel Joe R. Sherr was the Commander, Station 6, Second Signal Service Company. He was stationed in the Philippines at the outbreak of World War II and led intercept efforts as U.S. Forces withdrew to Corregidor Island. There, he was selected to accompany General MacArthur to Australia in March 1942. In Australia, Sherr served as Chief, SIGINT Division, U.S. Armed Forces, Far East, until his death in a plane crash in September 1943.

5. **Koch Barracks.** Brigadier General Oscar W. Koch was Patton's G2 during World War II. He introduced the concept of fully integrated all-source intelligence which resulted in an organized product commanders could use for planning and decision making. Koch developed the concept of the multidiscipline G2 team which included combat intelligence, photo and map reconnaissance, interrogators, interpreters, psychological operations, enemy document exploitation, and clandestine operations.

6. **de Pasqua Barracks.** Sergeant Peter de Pasqua was a World War II undercover agent and member of the Corps of Intelligence Police (CIP). He infiltrated the German-sponsored subversive police movement and prevented severe losses to the Allies from enemy sabotage and espionage. de Pasqua was the first member of CIP to be awarded the Citation for Meritorious Service.

7. **Hall Dining Facility.** Virginia Hall was a clandestine agent for Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the OSS in World War II occupied France. She parachuted into France, her wooden leg under her arm, to gain fame as the "Limping Lady." She organized intelligence, sabotage, and resistance units. Her activities played a major role in securing the Allied victory in France. In a rare distinction for a civilian, Hall was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross at the end of the war. She went on to serve in the CIA until she retired in 1972.

8. **Yardley Dining Facility.** Major Herbert O. Yardley was a pioneer cryptologist and leader of U.S. cryptanalytic efforts during World War II. Following the war, Yardley established the famed "Black Chamber" in New York City where his successes revealed, among other things, Japanese negotiating positions at the Washington Naval Conference.

9. **Nicholson Hall.** Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. Nicholson Jr. was one of the last American casualties of the Cold War. He gave his life during a daring and sensitive mission while serving in the U.S. Military Liaison Mission to Commander, Group of Soviet Forces, in the former German Democratic Republic. Nicholson was posthumously promoted and awarded the Legion of Merit.

10. **Friedman Hall.** William F. Friedman was a master cryptologist and cryptanalyst. He helped pioneer the nation's SIGINT efforts in a long and distinguished career spanning the period from World War I until the 1960's. Friedman was instrumental in breaking Japanese codes at the outset of World War II.

11. **Wilson Barracks (NCO Academy Barracks).** Master Sergeant John R. Wilson was a CI agent and patrol leader in the Republic of Korea. He was killed in action on October 13, 1950, while leading an attack on a hostile position that resulted in the capture of 21 prisoners.

12. **Ice Hall (NCO Academy Academic Building).** Command Sergeant Major Clovis D. (Frosty) Ice was an early volunteer and pioneer for MI Airborne and Special Forces assignments. He was one of the original members of the 403d USASA Special Operations Detachment Airborne at Fort Bragg, N.C. He was responsible for improvements in the early manpack intercept equipment designed to support airborne operations.

13. **Hitt Hall (Battalion Headquarters Building).** Colonel Parker Hitt, veteran of the Spanish-American War, developed a lifelong interest in cryptology before World War I. His diligent efforts revealed and resolved serious deficiencies in Army ciphers then in use. Hitt wrote the first work ever published on cryptology in the U.S.: **A Manual for the Solution of Military Ciphers.**

14. 111th MI Brigade Maintenance Facility.




Photo courtesy of Major James R. Cormier

By Captain Chester F. Brown III

Back in 1991 Captain John D. Jackson wrote an article entitled, "Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)" (MIPB Oct-Dec 1991). He provided a clear, concise explanation of the BDA process used by the United States Central Command's BDA cell during Operation Desert Storm. However, BDA is just as important in intelligence analysis at the tactical level as it is at the operational and strategic levels. This article describes three BDA techniques which have been used with success at maneuver battalion, brigade, and division levels.

Decision Graphic Technique

One of the first techniques I used for tracking BDA was the Decision Graphic Technique, developed during a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) exercise. As a light infantry brigade S2, my task was to continually evaluate enemy strength at maneuver battalion level in our area of interest, and at company level in our area of operations. The intelligence analysts were instructed to apply all reports of casualties or damaged or destroyed equipment to the enemy unit closest to the area from which the reports originated.

The combat effectiveness of the enemy unit was

Tactical BDA Presentation Techniques



charted, using a Modified Decision Graphic, on the Enemy Situation Overlay.¹ Figure 1 shows a Modified Decision Graphic with the composition of the 22d Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR):

- ☐ Three mechanized infantry battalions (shown at a).
- ☐ A tank battalion (b).
- ☐ A self-propelled artillery battalion (c).
- ☐ An engineer company (d).

The effectiveness graphic (e) and the selected information graphic (f) show that, due to weapon system losses, the S2 assesses the 22d MRR's

combat effectiveness at 50 percent. The categories used in the selected information graphic match those in FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols.

At this point, the S2 may be expected to have a handle on tracking BDA from subordinate battalions as well as from division assets. However, we did not have a procedure in place to prevent reports from several sources being applied to the same BDA. In his article, Captain Jackson accurately points out that, "The most important asset for sorting out conflicting BDA is your reasoning ability."² He also stresses the importance of verifying reports from one intelligence discipline with collection assets from other disciplines: confirming scout platoon reports (human intelligence [HUMINT]) with Unmanned Aerial Vehicle flights (imagery intelligence [IMINT]) and low-level voice intercepts (signals intelligence [SIGINT]).

While this technique may validate the BDA report's accuracy, it can't

consistently determine which enemy unit is affected nor the level of degradation sustained. The best way to determine which enemy unit has sustained damage is to train soldiers intensively on the enemy's order of battle. Units that look alike on the battlefield often can be distinguished from one another by their equipment. (This is evident in the structures of warring military and paramilitary forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, and Haiti.) If your soldiers can match certain pieces of equipment (indicators) with the unit that uses them, they are better able to identify the unit that has sustained damage.




Figure 1. Modified decision graphic.

Additionally, the new Intelligence Branch Operational Concept (IBOC) gives tactical level S2s

greater access to collection assets that can identify units by the specificity of their sensor packages. If these assets have already identified the unit, then the process of subtracting damaged or destroyed equipment simply involves matching that equipment with the nearest unit so equipped.

Murder Board Technique

The second technique used to track BDA is the infamous "murder board." (See Figure 2.) The murder board is nothing more than a graphic representation of all of the




Figure 2. Murder board.

vehicles subordinated to a particular enemy unit. The murder board is best suited for tracking the BDA of weapon systems or vehicles of the enemy's conventional mounted units.

To use the murder board, place a slash through each item of equipment as it is identified. If the item is destroyed, mark it with an "X." Also, to help clarify the murder board, use different colors for slashes and X's to identify the reports according to intelligence disciplines. For example, if an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle flight identifies 10 T-72 tanks, a red slash (IMINT) is drawn on 10 T-72 tank silhouettes. If a low-level voice intercept team identifies an enemy tank company in the same location, a blue slash (SIGINT) is drawn alongside and parallel to the red slash. This shows at a glance that two different sources have identified the same enemy force.

If the Aviation Battalion reports that it has just destroyed 10 tanks in the same area, the silhouettes are crossed out with a black "X" (HUMINT). The report of the destruction of the tank company should then be followed up by confirming the BDA with additional intelligence assets or another intelligence discipline.

The simplicity of the murder board helps the entire battle staff understand the enemy order of battle, how much of the enemy forces we have detected, how much we have destroyed, and how much we still have to find and kill. Additional murder boards can be constructed using aircraft and artillery/mortar symbols to help the Air Defender and Fire Support Officer (FSO) at battalion and brigade track the enemy systems they are tasked with destroying. Another technique is to give the FSO his own murder board of high payoff targets. This helps the targeting cell track the S2's success in finding high payoff targets and the FSO's success in destroying them.

BDA Chart

The third method of tracking BDA involves a graphic-oriented chart based on the enemy's composition. (See Figure 3.) Also developed and used during a BCTP exercise, this chart uses standard graphics and symbology representing the composition of an enemy MRR. The symbol at the top of the chart (a) provides the overall unit identification. The Unit column (b) lists subordinate units.

The assessed combat effectiveness of the

<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>(a)</p> <p>22 42</p> </div> <div style="text-align: right;"> <p>(c) DTG FM _____ TO _____</p> </div> </div>									
(b)	(d)	IFV-BMP/BTR		TANKS		(e) 2S1/MORTARS		OTHER	
UNIT	CBT EFF	TO&E	D/STRD	TO&E	D/STRD	TO&E	D/STRD	TO&E	D/STRD
		(f) 39	(g) 13			6X 120 mm		9X SA-14	
		39	26			6X 120 mm		9X SA-14	
		39	14			6X 120 mm		9X SA-14	
		2	1	41	15				
		9				18	6		
								12X SA-9	4
		11	8					3X MTU-20	3
		6	2					4X R/TNS	
		8	8	6	6			6X SA-9	2

Figure 3. Battle damage assessment chart.

enemy units is shown in two places. First, the 22d MRR's effectiveness is shown in the effectiveness graphic to the right of the unit symbol at the top of the chart (c). Second, each subordinate unit's effectiveness is shown in the graphic in the Combat Effectiveness (CBT EFF) column (d). As a unit becomes less effective, the graphic is filled in. Figure 3 shows half of the effectiveness graphic filled in, indicating that the 22d MRR is at approximately half strength. A unit is considered combat ineffective when its graphic is filled in completely. If time allows, the combat effectiveness percentage estimate could be written alongside the effectiveness symbol.

The bold lines across the top of the chart (e) are the item lines. Initially blank, these lines are filled in during IPB. The S2 adjusts the items that are important enough to track their destruction.³ The items can be broken down further by model number and specific name. For example, instead of listing IFV-BMP/BTR on the item line, BMP-2 can be entered in the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) column (f) next to the unit so equipped to differentiate it from the units equipped with BTR-80 vehicles.

However, the main purpose of the TO&E column is to list the quantity of the items within the specific enemy unit. In this example, the order of battle lists 39 infantry fighting vehicles in each Motorized Rifle Battalion. As BDA reports come in they are subtracted from the beginning strength of the unit. The S2 then makes a periodic assessment of that unit's combat effectiveness. The total destroyed equipment is listed in the destroyed (D/STRD) column (g). A running total can be kept; however, a faster method is to use tick marks for items reported as destroyed and subtract them periodically to support your commander and other battle staff officers.

The date-time group from and to lines are used to record the time period the chart is used. The S2 tabulates particular snapshots of the unit's strength to show the effect of your fires, maneuver, terrain, or weather on the enemy.

The use of unit

symbolology and graphics on the chart reduces the likelihood of error when assessing BDA against a specific force on the situation overlay and transferring it to the chart. The symbolology of the unit you subtract the totals from is just as it appears on the S2's situation overlay. Additionally, since the charts are usually posted on the periphery of the situation map, the enemy unit's order of battle is always visible and reinforces the analyst's knowledge of the enemy's composition and capabilities. However, the constant drawback of using this chart is training analysts to match the reports of BDA against particular units.

Summary

These three techniques have been developed over time and incorporate the ideas of many soldiers. This article is neither a school solution, nor a call for widespread use of these techniques in presenting BDA. However, they have worked, with varying degrees of success, in the past.

The emergence of updated doctrine, the new IBOC, and increased emphasis on predictive analysis force us to develop more accurate and timely methods of not only presenting BDA information, but also tracking it. In order for the MI Corps to accomplish this we must look at our capabilities to collect and track BDA information. The intelligence collection systems that are fielded, and planned for fielding in the near future, only provide S2s with targeting accuracy information. These systems don't provide sufficient resolution for S2s to perform accurate BDA.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard C. Halbleib states in




Photo courtesy of Major James R. Cormier



his BDA White Paper that during Operation Desert Storm, "Reconnaissance systems were frequently unable to determine if attacked tanks and armored vehicles were operable. The cause was the collection system's inability to image small, but usually often lethal external damage created by many of today's modern munitions."

Since it is necessary to confirm BDA reports from one intelligence discipline to another, does cross-cueing different sensor types eliminate the need for higher resolution systems? The answer is no. Current IMINT systems are limited by weather conditions and are degraded by camouflage, concealment, and decoys.

SIGINT limitations include difficulty correlating data with specific targets. The enemy's use of strict radio discipline, land lines, and couriers also limits SIGINT's effectiveness in conducting BDA. HUMINT reports may be inaccurate due to subjectivity, the "fog of war," and other human frailties.⁴

How can we apply the effectiveness of our ability to destroy enemy equipment against his combat effectiveness? Do our collection systems and agencies provide information on all of the enemy's battlefield operating systems? How do we determine, with certainty, the enemy's effectiveness based on leadership, training, health, morale, and the will to win? The broad brush approach to es-

timating these factors is not specific enough for current Army warfighting operations.

S2s must apply these factors to the specific enemy they are facing. We can't do this with the systems available now. The Army must develop and field, or provide S2s access to, collectors that can give us sufficiently detailed information to conduct BDA. Only then can we provide our commanders with an accurate analysis and its impact on the enemy's combat effectiveness.

I would like to learn how others have tracked BDA. I welcome any comments or additional techniques you may have used. My address is: Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, DTIMS, Tactics Division, ATTN: MIOAC Committee (CPT Brown), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000

Endnotes

1. FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Symbols*, October, 1985, Ch 3, 3-1, 3-2.
2. CPT John D. Jackson, "Battle Damage Assessment," MIPB, October-December 1991, 19.
3. Student Text (ST) 100-9, *The Command Estimate Process*, July 1992, Ch 1, 1-1.
4. LTC Richard C. Halbleib, *BDA White Paper*, January 1992, 6.

CPT Brown is an instructor for the MIOAC. Before going to OCS, he was a Voice Interceptor (Chinese-Mandarin). Other assignments include assistant S2 and S2, 1st Brigade; S2, 1-22 Infantry Battalion; platoon leader, GSR/REMBASS, B Company, 110th MI Battalion; and chief, G2, ASPS with the 10th Mountain Division.

and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), and by increasing the number of Project Warrior officers (former observer/controllers at the CTCs) on our faculty here. A new addition to our courses of instruction is an integrated field training exercise (IFTX) which combines students from all courses (AIT through OAC) in a single FTX. The IFTX provides hands-on training on many of our new systems to students as they proceed through six stations replicating the intelligence operations at every echelon, from maneuver battalion through EAC.

We are also developing a new course for field grade MI officers, which will be integrated into the Command and General Staff College curriculum. It will fill a void in our professional development for MI officers.

The move of the Intelligence School-Devens to Fort Huachuca is another element of the extraordinary changes underway. In my view, this move is a dream come true, accentuating the fact that Fort Huachuca is the Home of Military Intelligence. One benefit from the consolidation is that we now have enough intelligence equipment at one location to be able to give students hands-on training and to run the IFTX.

Another benefit from the consolidation is the construction of some of the most beautiful barracks, dining facilities, and applied instruction buildings you have ever seen. At this time, we have over \$160 million in new construction either just completed or underway; by the end of this fiscal year, the total amount of new construction will exceed \$200 million; and by 1996 the figure will be over \$300 million. A key event that has made this possible is the Base Realignment and Closure legislation of 1988 and 1991 which directed the move of the Intelligence School-Devens to Fort Huachuca and enabled us to assume command of the installation on October 1, 1990. Our assumption of command of Fort Huachuca solidified it as the Home of Military Intelligence, and we have done our utmost to ensure that it is a home of which all members of the MI Corps can be proud.

In addition to new systems, new training courses, new facilities, and the consolidation of the two major elements of the Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, we have also been very active in revising MI doctrine and restructuring enlisted and officer career fields to ensure they are relevant and viable.

We have written new doctrinal manuals, and we

are rewriting much of our existing doctrine. Two new manuals address former voids in our doctrinal base. **FM 34-2-1, Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance**, and **FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence**, were written to fill critical voids identified at the CTCs. Both have been well received by the field and are widely used. **FM 34-8** has also been included in the mandatory read-ahead package for BCTP.

In addition to these new manuals, we have rewritten **FM 34-1, IEW Operations** (our capstone manual); **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**; and **FM 34-7, IEW Support to Low Intensity Conflict Operations**. We are in the process of rewriting **FM 34-2, Collection Management**, to incorporate synchronization planning and to make it the best collection management manual we have ever written.

In the area of proponentcy, we have capitalized on the talent of our soldiers to consolidate related MOSs and restructure others to ensure they remain viable, while achieving training economies and assignment flexibility. Thus far, we have consolidated five MOSs into two and are staffing the consolidation of four others. We also have restructured two MOSs—97G and 96H—and are staffing the restructuring of two others—97B and 97E—to keep them viable during this change. Finally, we have created two new MOSs—96U, UAV Operator, for the Active Component; and 97L, Linguist, for the Reserve Component.

Equally important, has been the establishment of our "must fill" assignment policy for officers, which has enabled us to focus our limited officer population on the most important needs of our Army. Our "must fill" policy has become the operative Officer Distribution Plan governing MI officer assignments and has enabled us to increase the fill of MI captains in maneuver battalion S2 positions from 35 percent 2 years ago to 90 percent today.

These are but a few of our accomplishments at the Intelligence Center. They are the work of some of the most dedicated and talented military and civilian personnel with whom I have ever served. All of the credit for these and countless other achievements goes to them, and I am truly grateful for what they have done, despite severely reduced budgets and shrinking staffs.

With all we have accomplished, there is and always will be much more to do. I recently sent a message to all G2s and MI commanders asking their assistance in improving four areas: S2 training, collection management, predictive analysis, and collective training. We absolutely must improve

in these areas, without becoming complacent in others.


Our contribution to the combined arms battle is critical; in my mind, the most critical. We are the key to victory on any battlefield, because we enable commanders to focus and leverage their combat power to fight smart and win decisively with a minimum loss of lives. To do this, we can never slow down, become stagnant, or give other than our best.

It is for that reason that I am delighted that Major General John Stewart is replacing me. He knows our branch and our business across the board. He has been working closely with us at the Intelligence

Center to implement and refine key elements of our new operational concept, as well as to develop enhanced software functionality for ASAS through rapid prototyping. Major General Stewart is clearly the right man in the right place to set the stage for our entry into the 21st century. We all must support the new Chief of MI, for there is no more important job or more pressing agenda in our Corps.

As I leave, I want to thank each of you for your support. We could not have accomplished what we did without your outstanding contributions, and our Branch and our Corps would not be held in the high esteem they are today without your superb performance every day.

PROPONENT NOTES



Officer Notes

The Department of the Army has announced the results of the FY 92 Major Selection Board and the Command and General Staff College Board. A review of the results shows that some common elements lead to promotion.

Major Selection Board results show a strong correlation between serving as a company commander and selection to major. Successful company command was a factor in over 87 percent of the selectees. Many of those selected had strong reports as S2s or foreign area officers. Most of those not selected had center of mass or below center of mass command reports and patterns of below center of mass performance. Of those not selected, 40 percent had not held command positions.

This year, MI Special Electronic Mission Aircraft Aviators were 20 percent more likely to be promoted to major, with a 69.2 percent selection rate. Armywide, the selection rate for major was 71.1 percent. At 73.5 percent, the MI section rate was up from previous years. Year group reductions caused by the voluntary separation program increased the percentage.

CGSC Selection Board considered four year groups—1979, '80, '81, and '82. Again, results showed a correlation between command and selection. Eighty-seven percent of the selectees held command positions. From year groups '81 and '82, 91 percent held command positions while the other

9 percent had been S2s.

The **ROTC Selection Board** was held in December. MI did well in the acquisition of new MI lieutenants, with 300 cadets listing MI as their first branch choice. This compares favorably with last year. However, we could only select 108 for duty with MI because of the FY 92 training management population (those deferred from the last board) and U.S. Military Academy and OCS accessions. Interestingly, the numbers show that MI Branch satisfaction is at an all-time high of 99.1 percent.

Cadet quality was outstanding by every measure. Cadets selected for MI had an average grade point average of 3.28 and camp score of 4.01. Thirty cadets had been regimental or battalion commanders, 15 had been executive officers, and 17 were S3s. Thirty-nine received Regular Army commissions. Thirteen of the 108 selectees are participating in the branch detail program.

Warrant Officer Notes

The Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP) is on its way to full implementation. The plan revises the warrant officer education system and lays the groundwork for better planning and management of warrant officer careers. Currently, DA is addressing two significant management actions—Rank Coding Tables and Warrant Officer Life Cycle Models:

1. We have completed the **Rank Coding Tables**

(standards of grade for warrant officers) and have submitted them to DA. This required coding of every documented MI warrant officer position by rank. Positions are coded and capped as follows. CW5, 5 percent; CW4, 13 percent; CW3, 24 percent; and CW2 and WO1, 58 percent. These rank coding tables include an additional table that identifies positions coded branch specific, but MOS immaterial. These positions are the Assignment Manager, PERSCOM; Professional Development Officer, OCMI; and the Warrant Officer Course Manager, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Intelligence Center. All three positions are coded CW5 and MOS Code 9991.

Once DA approves this action, we will use the

MIPB to inform you of the rank distribution by Tables of Organization and Equipment and Tables of Distribution and Allowance at echelons above and below corps.

2. DA has approved the **Warrant Officer Life Cycle Models** for publication in DA Pam 600-11, **Warrant Officer Professional Development**. These models provide type career paths by MOS to help warrant officers plan their careers. Because of the dynamic environment in which we operate, there will be adjustments to the models as MOSs are consolidated or revised. The following illustrations show the MOS structure currently in effect for MOSs 350B, 350D, 350L, 351B, 351C, 351E, 352C, 352G, 352H, 352J, and 353A.

ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE TECHNICIAN, MOS 350B LIFE CYCLE MODEL

YRS WO SVC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
GRADE	WO1	CW2				CW3				CW4				CW5																
INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING	W O B C	WOAC PHASE I				RES PHASE				WOSC				WOSSC																
		DALASP, ANA325 ANA380, COL305										FUNCTIONAL TRAINING NSP500, NSP310, NSP311, NSP312										LIC320, LIC326 LIC330, NFI300 NFI330, LIC315								
OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS	DIVISION G2 ACR S2, SEP BDE/TF S2										CORPS G2, INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF EAC, NTC/JRTC, JOINT SPEC OPS, SPEC DTY NON DOD										INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF JOINT, MACOM HQ/U&S CMD									
	AA STUDIES										MASTER OF SCIENCE IN STRATEGIC INTEL AT DIC										CONTINUING ED/GRADUATE STUDIES									
	SELF-DEVELOPMENT	BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN DEF INTEL AT DIC										BACCALAUREATE STUDIES																		
PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL READING/STUDY BACHELOR'S AND MASTER'S PROGRAMS AT THE DIC ARE AVAILABLE AND ENCOURAGED BUT NOT REQUIRED.																														

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE TECHNICIAN, MOS 350D LIFE CYCLE MODEL

YRS WO SVC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30				
GRADE	WO1	CW2				CW3				CW4				CW5																				
INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING	W O B C	WOAC PHASE I				RES PHASE				WOSC				WOSSC																				
		FUNCTIONAL TRAINING DSIATP, TENCAR, COL305, LIC315, LIC320, LIC326, NFI300, NSP500																																
OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS	ECB AND SPEC OPS										INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF JOINT, SPEC OPS, SPEC DTY NON-DOD										INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF MACOM HQ/U&S CMD													
	AA STUDIES										MASTER OF SCIENCE IN STRATEGIC INTEL AT DIC										CONTINUING ED/GRADUATE STUDIES													
	SELF-DEVELOPMENT	BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN DEF INTEL AT DIC										BACCALAUREATE STUDIES																						
PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL READING/STUDY																																		
BACHELOR'S AND MASTER'S PROGRAMS AT THE DIC ARE AVAILABLE AND ENCOURAGED BUT NOT REQUIRED																																		

ATTACHE OPERATIONS TECHNICIAN, MOS 350L LIFE CYCLE MODEL

YRS WO SVC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
GRADE	WO1	CW2				CW3				CW4				CW5																
INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING	W O B C	WOAC PHASE I RES PHASE				FUNCTIONAL TRAINING DALASP LANGUAGE TNG				WOSC				WOSSC																
OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS	US EMBASSIES WORLDWIDE								DIA FLD SPT CTR												DIA FLO SPT CTR									
SELF-DEVELOPMENT	AA STUDIES				MASTER OF SCIENCE IN STRATEGIC INTEL AT DIC												BACCALAUREATE STUDIES				CONTINUING ED/GRADUATE STUDIES									
	BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN DEF INTEL AT DIC																													
	PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL READING/STUDY BACHELOR'S AND MASTER'S PROGRAMS AT THE DIC ARE AVAILABLE AND ENCOURAGED BUT NOT REQUIRED																													

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE TECHNICIAN, MOS 351B LIFE CYCLE MODEL

YRS WO SVC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30										
GRADE	WO1	CW2				CW3				CW4				CW5																										
INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING	W O B C	WOAC				FUNCTIONAL TRAINING				WOSC				WOSSC				NFI330, NSP500																						
		PHASE I		RES PHASE																																				
		DALASP, AFCITIC FBI ACADEMY LANGUAGE TNG, COL305, LIC315, LIC320, LIC326, LIC330, NSP310, 311, 312, 313, 314																																						
OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS	ECB INSCOM CI DET, INSCOM CE/TE																INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF, JOINT DTY EAC, SPEC OPS, NON DOD SPEC DTY														INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF HQ INSCOM, EAC									
	SELF-DEVELOPMENT	AA STUDIES				MASTER OF SCIENCE IN STRATEGIC INTEL AT DIC												BACCALAUREATE STUDIES				CONTINUING ED/GRADUATE STUDIES																		
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN DEF INTEL AT DIC																																								
PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL READING/STUDY BACHELOR'S AND MASTER'S PROGRAMS AT THE DIC ARE AVAILABLE AND ENCOURAGED BUT NOT REQUIRED																																								

SEE AR 614-114

AREA INTELLIGENCE TECHNICIAN, MOS 351C LIFE CYCLE MODEL

YRS WO SVC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30										
GRADE	WO1	CW2				CW3				CW4				CW5																										
INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING	W O B C	WOAC PHASE I				RES PHASE				WOSC				WOSSC																										
		FUNCTIONAL TRAINING																																						
OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS																																								
SELF-DEVELOPMENT																																								
PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL READING/STUDY																																								
BACHELOR'S AND MASTER'S PROGRAMS AT THE DIC ARE AVAILABLE AND ENCOURAGED BUT NOT REQUIRED																																								

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION TECHNICIAN, MOS 351E LIFE CYCLE MODEL

YRS WO SVC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	
GRADE	WO1	CW2					CW3					CW4					CW5														
INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING	W O B C	WOAC PHASE I RES PHASE					WOSC					WOSSC																			
		DALASP, STRAT DEBRIEFING ADV LANGUAGE					FUNCTIONAL TRAINING COL305, LIC315, LIC320, LIC326										NSP310, 311, 312 NSP313, 314 NFI330, NSP500														
		DIVISION AND BELOW CORPS, SPEC OPS, INSCOM					INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF, JOINT DTY NTC/JRTC, NON DOD SPEC DTY, SPEC OPS, HQ INSCOM										INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF, HQ INSCOM														
OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS	AA STUDIES					MASTER OF SCIENCE IN STRATEGIC INTEL AT DIC										CONTINUING ED/GRADUATE STUDIES															
	BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN DEF INTEL AT DIC					BACCALAUREATE STUDIES										PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL READING/STUDY															
SELF-DEVELOPMENT	BACHELOR'S AND MASTER'S PROGRAMS AT THE DIC ARE AVAILABLE AND ENCOURAGED BUT NOT REQUIRED																														

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TECHNICIAN, MOS 352C LIFE CYCLE MODEL

YRS WO SVC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30										
GRADE	WO1		CW2				CW3				CW4				CW5																									
INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING	W O B C	WOAC				WOSC				WOSSC																														
		PHASE I				RES PHASE																																		
		LANGUAGE TNG				FUNCTIONAL TRAINING														NSP500, NFI330																				
		CY500, ANA380, COL305, LIC315, LIC320, LIC326, NFI300, CY600																																						
OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS	DIVISION				INSCOM																																			
	ACR/SEP BDE				CORPS				SPEC OPS																															
															INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF, JOINT NTC/JRTC, NON DOD SPEC DTY																									
SELF-DEVELOPMENT	AA STUDIES				MASTER OF SCIENCE IN STRATEGIC INTEL AT DIC																																			
	BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN DEF INTEL AT DIC				BACCALAUREATE STUDIES																																			
															CONTINUING ED/GRADUATE STUDIES																									
	PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL READING/STUDY																																							
	BACHELOR'S AND MASTER'S PROGRAMS AT THE DIC ARE AVAILABLE AND ENCOURAGED BUT NOT REQUIRED																																							

VOICE INTERCEPT TECHNICIAN, MOS 352G LIFE CYCLE MODEL

YRS WO SVC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30										
GRADE	WO1	CW2					CW3					CW4					CW5																							
INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING	W O B C	WOAC PHASE I RES PHASE					WOSC					WOSSC																												
		ADV LANGUAGE CY500, COL305, LIC315, NSP310, 311, 312, 313, 314, NSP500, CY600															FUNCTIONAL TRAINING CY500, COL305, LIC315, NSP310, 311, 312, 313, 314, NSP500, CY600																							
		DIVISION, ACR/SEP BDE CORPS															INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF, INSCOM, JOINT DTY SPEC OPS, NON DOD SPEC DTY																							
OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS	INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF HQ INSCOM																																							
	AA STUDIES					MASTER OF SCIENCE IN STRATEGIC INTEL AT DIC															BACCALAUREATE STUDIES										CONTINUING ED/GRADUATE STUDIES									
SELF-DEVELOPMENT	BACHELORS OF SCIENCE IN DEF INTEL AT DIC															BACCALAUREATE STUDIES															CONTINUING ED/GRADUATE STUDIES									
	PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL READING/STUDY BACHELOR'S AND MASTER'S PROGRAMS AT THE DIC ARE AVAILABLE AND ENCOURAGED BUT NOT REQUIRED.																																							

CONVENTIONAL SIGNALS COLLECTION TECHNICIAN, MOS 352H LIFE CYCLE MODEL

YRS WO SVC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
GRADE	WO1	CW2				CW3				CW4				CW5																
INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING	W O B C	W.O.A.C. PHASE I				RES PHASE				WOSC				WOSSC																
		FUNCTIONAL TRAINING																												
		CY500, COL305, NSP500, CY600																												
OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS	ALL OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS OPEN																													
	INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF, NON DOD SPEC DTY																INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF, HQ INSCOM													
SELF-DEVELOPMENT	AA STUDIES				MASTER OF SCIENCE IN STRATEGIC INTEL AT DIC																									
	BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN DEF INTEL AT DIC				BACCALAUREATE STUDIES																CONTINUING ED/GRADUATE STUDIES									
	PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL READING/STUDY																													
BACHELOR'S AND MASTER'S PROGRAMS AT THE DIC ARE AVAILABLE AND ENCOURAGED BUT NOT REQUIRED																														

NONCONVENTIONAL SIGNALS COLLECTION TECHNICIAN, MOS 352J LIFE CYCLE MODEL

YRS WO SVC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30			
GRADE	WO1	CW2				CW3				CW4				CW5																			
INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING	W O B C	WOAC				WOSC				WOSSC																							
		PHASE I		RES PHASE																													
		FUNCTIONAL TRAINING TENCAP TNG, CY500, COL305, NSP500, CY600																															
OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS	ECHELONS CORPS AND BELOW																																
	INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF INSCOM, NON DOD SPEC DTY																																
	INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF HQ INSCOM																																
SELF-DEVELOPMENT	AA STUDIES				MASTER OF SCIENCE IN STRATEGIC INTEL AT DIC																												
	BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN DEF INTEL AT DIC				BACCALAUREATE STUDIES																CONTINUING ED/GRADUATE STUDIES												
	PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL READING/STUDY BACHELOR'S AND MASTER'S PROGRAMS AT THE DIC ARE AVAILABLE AND ENCOURAGED BUT NOT REQUIRED																																

IEW SYSTEMS REPAIR TECHNICIAN, MOS 353A LIFE CYCLE MODEL

YRS WO SVC			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30					
GRADE			WO1		CW2				CW3				CW4						CW5																		
INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING	W O B C	WOAC				RES				WOSC						WOSSC																					
		PHASE I				PHASE																															
		FUNCTIONAL TRAINING TNG W/INDUSTRY																																			
OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS	DIVISION, ACR/SEP BDE				CORPS, SEP MAINT UNITS																																
											INTEL SCH INSTRUCTOR/STAFF R&D, INSCOM, SPEC DTY																										
SELF-DEVELOPMENT	AA STUDIES																																				
											BACCALAUREATE STUDIES																										
																					CONTINUING ED/GRADUATE STUDIES																
PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL READING/STUDY BACHELOR'S AND MASTER'S PROGRAMS AT THE DIC ARE AVAILABLE AND ENCOURAGED BUT NOT REQUIRED																																					

Enlisted Notes

Ever wonder what other MOSs in your section are supposed to do? Have you ever wondered why there are a certain number of privates first class through staff sergeants in your TOE section? Perhaps your raters or senior raters have asked you what position they should recommend you for on your NCO evaluation. If you don't know where to find this information, get a copy of **AR 611-201, Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupational Specialties** from your Personnel Administration Center or command sergeant major. This regulation contains descriptions of your MOS's primary duties at each skill level, physical demands, and which Additional Skill Identifiers (ASIs) are applicable, as well as other valuable information for enlisted soldiers and NCOs.

OCMI is assessing the need for an ASI for the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Maintainer, MOS 33R. This ASI will allow MOS 33R soldiers to be trained on UAV electronic systems and assigned to UAV units. The first UAV unit is scheduled to be equipped in fourth quarter FY 95.

Recent force alignment reviews show that MOSs 96B, 96D, 97G, and 97B have been chronically short at the grade of sergeant. It appears that many eligible soldiers at grade E4 are being denied available promotion opportunities. Our commanding general addressed these concerns in a message to field commanders. The purpose is to make commanders aware of the situation and to encourage them to ensure all qualified MI soldiers are given promotion opportunities.

The retirement of the OV-10 Mohawk will be completed by FY 97. This coincides with fielding the UAV and the Ground Station Modules for the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS). As the primary operator for Joint STARS, MOS 96H is now titled, "Imagery Ground Station Operator."

Clearly, soldiers in MOS 96R need to be concerned about their careers. For example, the PPS-5 radar, associated with MOS 96R, is being withdrawn from the heavy division. Under the new Force Design Update, all PPS-15's—another radar associated with MOS 96R—will go to the light division, and UAVs will go to heavy divisions. However, new systems such as the Light Battlefield Surveillance System and Nightstalker are coming on line. This will allow MOS 96R to remain in the MI MOS inventory well into the future.

Language Notes

OCMI and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence, Operations, and Personnel and Major Commands are working closely to find solutions for

Arabic dialect shortages. These shortages are caused by constant mission changes, recruiting shortfalls, and inflexible Arabic dialect assignment policies. In response, the Army Language Program Manager has announced that future assignments of Arabic dialect linguists will be managed as "dialect immaterial." This means that any Arabic dialect linguist may fill any Arabic dialect position. In addition, the Recruiting Command is trying to recruit more Arabic dialect linguists from the second or third generation Arabic population.

OCMI has completed a comprehensive analysis of the Army Language Program and will recommend short- and long-term improvements. We will inform you as DA reviews and approves these recommendations.

DA continues to staff MOS 97L, Translator/Interpreter for the Reserve Components (RC). MOS 97L will provide the Active Component (AC) with translator/interpreter support in various foreign languages. This will allow current AC linguists to concentrate on their primary missions.

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

OCMI accepts nominations for the MI Hall of Fame throughout the year. Anyone may nominate an individual for induction. Eligible for nomination are commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or civilians who have served in a U.S. Army Intelligence unit or in an intelligence position in the U.S. Army. The nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI. In certain instances (particularly concerning a junior enlisted soldier), the nomination may be based on heroic actions and valorous awards rather than a documented contribution. Nominees may not be employed by the U.S. government in any capacity at the time of their nomination.

A Hall of Fame Board convenes annually to review nominations and to make recommendations to OCMI. However, OCMI is the final approving authority for induction into the Hall of Fame.

Submit nominations to: OCMI, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (CPT Jerry Thompson), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000 or call DSN 821-1180 or CM (602) 533-1180.

ATTENTION SUBSCRIBERS

Each quarter many magazines are returned to us as undeliverable. With the many unit consolidations, we ask that you provide MIPB with an accurate, updated address as soon as you know your mailing address will change.

Military Intelligence Corps Hall of Fame

The MI Corps Hall of Fame recognizes those who have made significant contributions to the history and formulation of Military Intelligence. Their contributions will live forever as reminders of our rich history.

Colonel Carl F. Eifler

Carl F. Eifler enlisted in the Reserves as a private in 1928. He was commissioned after completing his officer training through correspondence courses. Introduced to Intelligence while working undercover as a customs agent in Mexico, Mr. Eifler uncovered a Japanese spy ring which was attempting to sway Mexico over to the Axis powers. His customs superiors ignored this information, so he reported it to his Reserve unit advisor, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph S. Stilwell (later general). This initial contact began a lifelong friendship between the two men.

In early 1941, Captain Eifler was called to active duty and took command of K Company, 35th Infantry. In 1942, he was suddenly assigned to the Coordinator of Information (COI) (later renamed Office of Strategic Services) in Washington, D.C. General William J. Donovan, the COI, wanted to establish a paramilitary unit in the China/Burma/India (CBI) Theater, but Theater Commander General Stilwell opposed this. Because of his long acquaintance with General Stilwell, Eifler was chosen by General Donovan to train and command a group of saboteurs being sent to the CBI Theater. Captain Eifler handpicked the first 21 members of Detachment 101. He took the detachment through both American and British secret operations schools.

Major Eifler was able to overcome Stilwell's opposition and began operations behind enemy lines in Burma. Detachment 101 set up radio bases and befriended local natives, recruiting, training, and employing many of them as agents. Eifler established schools where natives could be taught all aspects of espionage and sabotage.

During World War II, Detachment 101 and its native agents were extremely effective behind the lines in Burma. The original detachment grew from Eifler's handpicked 21 to over 700 agents. Their operations involved direct action against the enemy. As well as providing intelligence, these agents rescued more than 200 downed airmen from capture, sabotaged the railway system, and cleared the enemy from a 10,000-square-mile area. They are credited with 5,428 known Japanese dead and some 10,000 wounded, while the detachment had only 22 American and 184 natives killed.

Colonel Eifler's personal courage is renowned in

MI. He was awarded the Air Medal for his piloting of small unarmed aircraft over Japanese occupied, uncharted jungle. He often flew to remote airstrips behind enemy lines to contact his agents. He also flew out the first captured Japanese pilot from enemy territory.

In November 1943, a B-24 bomber crashed in the Bay of Bengal, leaving 10 survivors afloat. Disregarding his personal safety, Colonel Eifler rescued the crew in a small, untested, and unarmed vessel through 450 miles of Japanese controlled waters. For this act of bravery, Colonel Eifler was awarded the Legion of Merit.

In December 1943, Colonel Eifler was again reassigned to Washington, D.C. This time, Eifler was asked if it was possible to kidnap the head scientist who was working on the atomic bomb in Germany. Although everyone else thought it was impossible, Colonel Eifler said he could do it. Again, he handpicked a team and began training. The plan was well into training and reconnaissance when the mission was scrubbed because of the successful testing of our own atomic bomb.

Colonel Eifler's next assignment was to penetrate mainland Japan by way of Korea. He recruited Korean agents from POW camps and trained them in secret operations. His agents were ready to infiltrate Japan in two-man submarines when the U.S. dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and eight days later Japan surrendered.

Colonel Eifler retired from the Army in 1947 having sustained serious head injuries from combat operations. However, the intelligence community did not forget him. In 1951, the newly formed CIA asked Eifler if he would be interested in smuggling arms into French Indochina. He refused, saying he would do anything that would help his country but not as an unprotected civilian. Later, the CIA asked him to go behind enemy lines in Korea with his own unit. He accepted, but CIA physicians refused to allow it, simply stating "this man has had enough."

Colonel Eifler devoted his life to government service and, specifically, to intelligence. From his work as an undercover agent in Mexico, through his command of Detachment 101, to CIA job offers, Colonel Eifler remains a legend and a hero in Military Intelligence.



TOTAL FORCE



Civilian Again

If you are one of the thousands of soldiers leaving active duty and want to continue your career in the National Guard or Reserves, here are some tips for success.

Don't get discouraged. Since the Active Force is being cut drastically, you will be competing with many soldiers with the same goal. This need not be a stopper, but rather requires a well planned path. There really exists a Total Force of units and individual slots, and, believe me, there are still lots of opportunities.

Get a job. Soldiers leaving Active Duty often seek out the "right" Reserve troop unit and, in fact, try to arrange an assignment months before ETS. This usually is a mistake since career and education factors can change their plans. So don't expect a unit commander to commit to you (no matter how good you are) before you're living and working in an area near the desired unit.

Be aware that serving in a Guard or Reserve unit is only part time. As you know, weekend duty will not support you and your family. While it's true that extra tours are available, they are designed to accomplish a particular objective and may only last from 45 to 90 days.

Not just MI. Often MI soldiers only seek MI units, and complain when one is not close by. This is a mistake. You have many other choices such as civil affairs, psychological operations, combat, and combat support units. They all have MI slots. Serving in such an assignment offers an opportunity to work in all aspects of MI—from security and CI, to strategic briefs—especially when you are assumed to be "the MI expert."

No slots available. OK, so you've searched all nearby units and still can't find an open slot, then what? First, you must be prepared to expend the same effort and ingenuity in your Reserve job search as you do in your civilian job search. Most active troops believe Reserve units have little or no turnover, that people stay in the same units year

after year. This is not true. Our mobile society creates job turnovers averaging about 30 percent in Reserve units; use this to your advantage.

Second, tell the commander you are good and want to prove it by serving "free" for a couple of weekend drills. This will impress the boss, allow you to show your stuff, and also earn valuable points good for retirement pay and promotion. And you will probably be in line for the next paid unit slot. Try it, it works.

No available weekends. You have landed a job that requires you to work on Saturdays, making you unavailable for weekend duty in the Guard or Reserves. But, because you are patriotic and want to serve, what do you do? Do not accept a discharge. In a few years your civilian job may offer more options; you will be more settled and better able to give time and effort to Reserve duty. In the interim, keep your name on the rolls and stay in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), where you can work with your personnel manager at ARPERCEN in St. Louis. The 800 series phone numbers by grade and MOS are available from your Reserve unit.

Individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs). There are about 10,000 opportunities for soldiers in the IRR to join the Selected Reserve as IMAs. Such a slot guarantees a two-week annual training tour with the same people with whom you will mobilize. Your ARPERCEN personnel manager will help you find such an assignment.

By staying active in the Ready Reserve, you can be recalled to active duty on a temporary basis or for special work. You could become a full-time soldier in the Active Guard Reserve (AGR). School opportunities exist with fenced quotas for long schools such as the Sergeant Major's Academy and the Army War College, and shorter courses such as Defense Intelligence Seminars. You can realistically expect to have a successful career and retirement at two or three grades higher than you are now.

Division Expansible Battalion

There is good news on this front. MI RELOOK at proponent is implementing a positive General Officer Steering Committee decision approving this RC MI restructure. Plans are underway to test this innovative concept with the 28th Division in Pennsylvania. Equipment for training is now moving to the Regional Training Site-Intelligence at Fort Dix. We plan to use the new "A" series design for the 128th MI Battalion. Linguist teams will be organized under the "L" series TOE allowing modular mobilization by language and MOS. The Army Reserve Command is modifying the existing document for testing in October.

The essence of the test is to pull some 65 MI MOS language-dependant slots from the 128th MI Battalion. Since it is unlikely that the 28th ID will be called upon to liberate Poland, Russian and Polish will no longer be target languages. The remaining slots or Expansible Battalion will continue to support the 28th Division during peacetime training.

The pulled MI linguist slots will cover Pennsylvania. They will be located in 5- to 10-person teams in Scranton, Alliquippa, or any ethnic-rich area from which we can recruit linguists. This will save the DLI cost and produce more skilled linguists. The particular language focus will be based on an Active Component MI shortfall. For example, if there is a contingency in the Ukraine, the 18th Airborne Corps needs interrogators fluent in Ukrainian. Using the 200K Mobilization Call, HQDA can pull the two interrogation teams from Pennsylvania that are fluent in Ukrainian for deployment with the 18th.

The concept is smart since citizen soldier skills are used. This makes the Reserves both useful and cost effective in helping the Active Force. At the same time, it makes sense to move the Expansible Battalions from the Reserves to the Guard. All the Guard division commanders and their G2s support such a move. Now is the time for this to happen. MI in the RC will be better served.

Notes and Comment

Army Reserve Commands. These two-star

Reserve geographic commands have increasing responsibility. With CONUS armies losing their *raison d'etat*—command and control of the Reserves—why not transfer some MI slots to the ARCOMs, especially those with large MI populations like the 97th at Fort Meade. Better yet, why not have an MI functional command?

MI AGRs. We see a need to hold an Intelligence Update Seminar at the MI Proponent some time this year. Let us know if you think this is a good move, topics you want covered, and attendance probabilities.

Successors. Too many commanders ignore tenure. Instead of seeking extensions, select and groom a qualified leader to replace you. Don't let an incompetent but "nice guy" succeed you. Just because there's a lieutenant colonel in your strategic MI detachment, that incumbent may not have the leadership and MI skills to command. Look at all available talent in other units and components before using the "good old boy" network. The RC, MI, and your unit will be stronger for it.

AR 135-382, RC MI. Finally, our MI RC regulation has been completely revised. It is available now and will be included in the next RC Personnel UPDATE. For a copy or to suggest changes, write to HQDA (DAMI-RA), ATTN: Colonel Hemmenway, Washington, D.C. 20310. Highlights include the inclusion of Army National Guard Issues, the MI Special Training Element Program, new security rules, linguist issues, and regional training. We in the MI community are committed to make this regulation current and one that serves your needs. Help us do this.

The bottom line is to stay involved whether in a troop unit or as an individual. As the Army end strength shrinks to 400K, the Reserve Component will become more significant, and your options will increase.

COL Joe Mesch and LTC Dave Miner work Reserve Forces issues at the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca. They can be reached at DSN 821-1176/77, CM (602) 533-1176/77; or by mail, ATTN: ATZS-RA. They encourage "Lettres to the Editor."



MP and CI personnel for segregation. The network that CI personnel and Haitian camp leadership established resulted in fewer problems and a smoother operation.

Timely, accurate, and reliable HUMINT again proved to be critical to the overall success of Operation GTMO, ensuring its role as an integral part of future humanitarian relief operations. This operation also demonstrated how the six traditional intelligence functions can be modified to satisfy the commander's requirements in support of humanitarian missions.

U.S. Military Forces will continue to play an increasing role in humanitarian assistance operations like Operation GTMO. In the future, working as part of a JTF or even a Combined Multinational Force will be the norm. To be truly effective, we need to learn the language of the Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard just to get the information the commander needs. In addition, the new world order concept has changed the rules of the game. As intelligence professionals, it behooves us to develop a global viewpoint and to

learn as much as we can about other peoples and cultures in order to fulfill the role we will be called upon to play.

1. **FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence**, HQDA, Washington, D.C., 28 September 1992, 1-2.
2. **FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict**, HQDA and Air Force, Washington, D.C., 5 December 1990, 1-7.
3. **Student Handout SHO TNCPCO, "Tactical Intelligence Process in Peacetime Contingency Operations,"** U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, September 1990, 1.
4. **FM 34-8, Combat Commander's Handbook on Intelligence**, HQDA, Washington, D.C., 28 September 1992, 1-1 and 1-2.
5. **FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield**, HQDA, Washington, D.C., May 1989, 1-1 and 1-2.
6. **CPT Christopher P. Costa, "Special Operations Intelligence Support to Operation Provide Comfort,"** MIPB, October-December 1992, 24-28.
7. **Student Outline TLXTXX, "Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations in Low Intensity Conflict,"** U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, September 1991, 1-2.
8. **FM 34-8, CounterIntelligence**, HQDA, Washington, D.C., February 1990, 5-1.

Captain Vick is currently assigned to the Intelligence Center. He was commissioned from William and Mary College, Virginia. Key assignments include assistant S2; and battalion S2 and S3 operations officer, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Abn), Special Operations Command. He participated in Operation Just Cause in Panama, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and Operation GTMO.

Order Processing Code
*6489

**Charge your order.
It's easy!**



Please send me _____ subscriptions of **Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin**.
\$6.50 (Domestic, APO and FPO); \$8.15 (Foreign) per year.

1 The total cost of my order is \$ _____. All prices include regular domestic postage and handling and are subject to change.

2 _____
(Company or personal name)

(Additional address/Attention line)

(Street Address)

(City, State, ZIP Code)

3 Please choose method of payment:

☐ Check payable to the Superintendent of Documents[illegible]

☐ MasterCard, ☐ VISA, or

[illegible]

4 Mail To.

Credit Card Signature

Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000

(Continued from page 15)

Vance-Owens plan that came out of the Geneva meetings in late December calls for Bosnia-Herzegovina to be divided into 10 autonomous zones. These zones will separate the major ethnic groups and at the same time allow the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to retain its sovereignty. The

Should conflict break out in Kosovo, we are likely to see a continuation of this diaspora in the Balkans region and beyond.

In addition, should the Serbs attempt ethnic cleansing of the two million Albanians in Kosovo, the conflict could spill into Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, and other countries. U.N. forces have been unable to implement a lasting cease-fire in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.N. agencies continue to investigate alleged war crimes against Muslims, specifically, ethnic cleansing policies and the establishment of detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Clinton's administration has supported several initiatives to end the conflict, including—

- ☐ Strengthening U.N. enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- ☐ Increasing U.S. airlift of humanitarian aid to areas surrounded by the Serbs.
- ☐ Committing U.S. and NATO ground forces as peacekeepers when all parties agree to the Vance-Owens Plan.


These initiatives will put sufficient political, economic, and long-term military pressure on the Serbian Government in Belgrade to stop their military support of the Bosnia Serbs. Another proposal that appears to be gaining support is to modify the U.N. arms embargo against

Bosnia-Herzegovina which would permit the Bosnian Muslims to acquire arms to defend themselves against the well-armed Serbian forces.

However, even if they were to end the conflict tomorrow, the events of the last several months have torn the nation apart. Putting the pieces back together will be a long and very difficult process.

Bibliography

- CIA. *The Former Yugoslavia - A Map Folio*. no. CPAS 92-10003. Washington, D.C.: DIA, July 1992.
- CIA. *Worldwide Peacekeeping Operations*. no. EUR 92-10027. Washington, D.C.: DIA, 1993.
- HQDA. *DA Pam 550-99, Yugoslavia - A Country Study*. Washington, D.C., 1992.
- Thomas, LTC Timothy L. "Ethnic Conflict: Scourge of the 1990's?" *Military Review*, December 1992.
- Yugoslav Working Group. *Briefing Slides no. 15*, Washington, D.C.; DIA, December 1992.
- Zametka, John. *Adelphi Paper 270, The Yugoslav Conflict*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992.
- Mr. Evancevich has worked on the Directorate of Combat Development's Threat Team and at the Asia Branch Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center. He holds a bachelor's degree in Political Science.



plan has thus far been approved by the governments of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but rejected by the Bosnian Serbs.

Under the Vance-Owens plan, the Bosnian Serbs stand to lose about 25 percent of the area they now control in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The plan could also be viewed as a threat to those areas in Croatia under Serb control (about a third of Croatia's territory).

A U.N. Protection Force was established in 1992 to separate Serbian and Croatian forces in Croatia. This force numbers about 16,000. Their mission has been expanded to include delivery of humanitarian assistance and evacuation of non-combatants. Another U.N. element is the Bosnia Buffer Force which numbers between 20,000 and 50,000. Their mission is to enforce or implement a cease-fire, to monitor human rights, and to provide humanitarian aid.

The conflict in Yugoslavia has produced more than two million refugees in its short duration.

Learning (Small Group Instruction) in an Academic Environment (BNCOC)

By Staff Sergeant Lucinda Tims

"Find success, copy it, and modify it to fit your needs." This is one of the many philosophies Command Sergeant Major John P. O'Connor, Commandant of the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, shared with his NCO Small Group Instruction leaders. I listened to these words and applied the concept as best I could. Slowly, but surely, the results became evident, and now the command sergeant major's words echo through the walls of my small classroom.

Anxiety levels are high, for both students and cadre, as anywhere from 100 to 130 NCOs enter their next level of Noncommissioned Officer Education System training—the Basic NCO Course (BNCOC). Standing by, ready to train students from all over the world, are some 20 well-trained NCOs who act as Small Group Instruction leaders, or facilitators.

Most NCOs have experienced the Small Group Instruction process, but some may not understand what the instructional concept is. Simply sitting in a circular formation does not constitute Small Group Instruction. The key to this instruction is the group dynamics within the circle and beyond. What is important is how the small group leader, or facilitator, motivates and guides the group to discuss, analyze, process, and apply information generated during the training session.

The class is broken down into groups of 16 students. For the first week, BNCOC small group leaders act as role models for the students and demonstrate how to apply Small Group Instruction. The students have an opportunity to see how the process works. In addition, students are able to see, by observation and experience, that the process **does** work. This gives them a basis from which they can learn and train. Essentially, after the first week, the students begin to train themselves. They eventually become each other's facilitators.

Since Small Group Instruction does not rely on

lectures or the authoritative approach to training, it may seem like an "easy way out" for the instructors. On the contrary, many instructors find it hard to withdraw from the authoritative approach to training. A small group leader's most important task is to guide the group in the right direction. This means that a good leader never supplies answers that can be found in doctrinal reference materials. Although a quick answer provides a quick solution, students won't retain the information long without discussion, analysis, processing, and application. By getting students to think for themselves, the responsibility for learning lies squarely with each soldier and with the group. When this happens, their learning becomes problem-solution oriented.

To reinforce this concept, leaders evaluate the group's ability to process questions generated by the group. This enhances the learning process and allows the students to answer questions by reasoning instead of knowledge-based memory. A good interrogative question demands that students **think** rather than simply remember the textbook answer. This teaching method allows students to process information based on their own unique experiences and application. Interestingly, this method isn't new—Aristotle used it to teach his students.

While acting as facilitator, each student gets an opportunity to train as a trainer in an academic environment. It gives students a chance to make mistakes and to learn before applying the training to real situations in their units. This helps alleviate anxiety that may keep NCOs from effectively leading their soldiers.

Group Dynamics

As the small group process develops, so does group dynamics. The group is broken down into teams, and the group leader watches the teams as they progress in and out of different stages of development. The students usually enter the course at a dependent level which is what we at the academy label, "low speed—high drag." Students

easily recognize this stage when it takes the team hours to make a simple decision. I have observed groups that could not come to a consensus within their team and essentially got nowhere fast. Gradually the students move in and out of the next stage, the independent stage, in an attempt to reach the final stage of development—interdependence or “high speed—low drag.”

Knowing about these different stages helps the students determine what stage the group is in by recognizing their strengths and weaknesses, and then overcoming them to meet their objectives. Ideally, the group accomplishes its goals as quickly and efficiently as possible.

The final stage is difficult to achieve because it usually requires more time than is available. It also requires openness and a collaborative leadership style from each participant. Although individual leaders in each group could reach the interdependent stage, the purpose of this training is to bring the **entire group** into the final stage of interdependence.

Although we focus on individual abilities, it is the teamwork of many that provides the greatest results, not the work of just one individual, regardless of that person's abilities. We at BNCOC know this to be true because we've observed it in action during Small Group Instruction and we've seen it played out in the performance of former students.

Academy Goals

Our goal at the academy is to teach students **how** to learn, not what to learn. This is why we use open book examinations. When soldiers get back to their units they need specific information to perform a task. If they rely on memory alone, they might forget an important step; but if they know where to find the information they need, they're more productive, accurate, and successful. That's why it's so important to get away from knowledge based training, because training that lasts beyond short-term memory must be performance based.

Some BNCOC students want to graduate as the best NCO who ever attended BNCOC; others just want to graduate! BNCOC cadre, on the other hand, are guided by rigid Army standards governing soldier training. That is, if a student doesn't meet the established standards, he or she doesn't graduate.

Ideally, what the academy produces, and what the standards support, is a class of competent leaders who can also be team players, trained with the Total Soldier Concept in mind.

The Total Soldier Concept

The Total Soldier Concept represents a well rounded NCO, one who is technically and tactically proficient in job skills as well as leadership skills. At the MI NCO Academy, our main purpose in life is to develop quality NCO leaders. Certainly, academic achievement is important, but the student's primary goal should be to develop his or her own leadership qualities, as a team player and as a leader.

At the academy, this process begins the moment the students arrive. From the minute a student is weighed in, to the Dining In, to performance on the FTX, small group leaders continually assess **each** student's leadership abilities. Rather than focusing on students with high GPAs, group leaders concentrate on how well **each** soldier leads and follows. Here, the focus is to develop leadership qualities in **every** NCO student.

Small group leaders evaluate soldiers on their written and oral communication skills, group participation, research abilities, and leadership skills. They base their evaluations on behavior and performance, rather than attitude. This results in a more objective evaluation, and helps ensure fairness within the system.

Tracking Results


Leadership is difficult to measure on a quantitative scale, especially when it encompasses the “total soldier.” Former students have told me their SQT scores increased because of their BNCOC instruction; however, my innermost reaction to this is, “But can they lead soldiers?”

I must say, the most satisfying result would be seeing our BNCOC graduates in action, back in their units, leading soldiers and training them with information they received here. I'm not referring to textbook information, but rather knowledge based on observation and experience. This separates a successful BNCOC graduate from a future BNCOC attendee.

Officially, 1989 was the Year of the NCO. Yet, for us at the academy, **every** year is the year of the NCO. The academy has made great strides in just 4 years in NCO education and leadership training. I believe we will have done our job if, after attending the academy, our students understand and apply the knowledge that BNCOC gives them.

Staff Sergeant Tims was a Small Group Instruction leader at the MI NCO Academy, and was the 1991 TRADOC NCO Instructor of the Year. To compete, she created a 12-minute presentation of her topic—physical fitness. To demonstrate her instructional abilities and also to provide a complete learning package, she made a tape of her presentation. This tape is used as the basis for physical fitness instruction at the U.S. Army Master Fitness Training School, Fort Benjamin Harrison. Staff Sergeant Tims is currently stationed in Darmstadt, Germany.

PROFESSIONAL READING



Negative Intelligence: The Army and the American Left, 1917-1941 by Roy Talbert Jr. (Jackson & London; University Press of Mississippi, 1992) 303 pages, \$37.50.

Don't let the title or subject of this book turn you away. This is not another parcel of Army-bashing. Rather, it's a well-crafted, superbly researched history of how the Negative Intelligence Branch of MI (hence the book's title) conducted surveillance operations against radicalism from World War I through the Red Scare and the Great Depression. Even if you disagree with his slant, today's intelligence professional should find Talbert's study interesting and useful.

In the 20th century, federal agencies have often conducted CI operations against radicalism in America. Talbert nicely places the fledgling Army Intelligence community within this national fight against the left. Although overshadowed by dramatic Justice Department programs, the Army played a large role in domestic spying on communists, labor unions, and other "subversive" groups. However, beginning with the creation of Colonel Ralph Van Deman's Intelligence agency in 1917, this role tapered off after the Red Scare of the 1920's, only to renew during the social upheavals of the Great Depression. Talbert ends his account in 1941 when the FBI gained control of all domestic Intelligence responsibilities.

Unlike some historians, Talbert does not romanticize the radicals nor underrate their domestic threat. Instead, he examines the situation from the Army Intelligence officer's standpoint. Yet, Talbert believes the threat was never as strong as the Army perceived. He also is alarmed by the Army's frequent abuse of civil liberties. This is a well-balanced, realistic look at the Army's domestic CI activities for a quarter-century.

Admittedly, Talbert takes a narrow view of the Army's CI operations: he gives only

peripheral attention to efforts against the German espionage and sabotage threat during World War II and doesn't attempt to cover operations against foreign intelligence agencies. Still, Talbert provides an excellent historical case study of CI operations. He gives a good account of the Army's methods and apparatus, including its alliances with private patriotic and right-wing groups. In doing so, he offers some insight into the complexities and difficulties of surveillance operations, especially in controlling elements that are dispersed over a wide area. As background to his examination, Talbert gives a top-notch description of the historical development of the first modern MI organization.

Talbert's study is an excellent history and he makes his arguments cogently and clearly. Moreover, he has done an astonishing amount of research, especially among recently declassified documents in the National Archives, making this work both informed and authoritative. In telling of this little-known episode, Talbert delivers a valuable, well-written addition to American intelligence history.

CPT Michael E. Bigelow
Fort Huachuca, AZ

The Fire This Time, U.S. War Crimes in the Gulf by Ramsey Clark (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1992), 325 pages, \$21.95.

Ramsey Clark, an internationally known lawyer and human rights activist, served as assistant U.S. attorney general and attorney general between 1961 and 1968. His book projects an unfavorable view of the cycle of events preceding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and our economic, political, and military efforts to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In fact, it is laden with sharp criticism of President Bush, our national command structure, other political leaders, and various leaders of the coalition.

Further, Clark believes the U.S. will con-

tinue to do all in its power to maintain dominance over the Persian Gulf (and other regions as well) even if it means the slaughter of thousands of what he calls defenseless civilians and against grossly overrated military "threats." According to Clark, the objective of this policy is to prevent any single state or combination of states from developing military capabilities that would threaten U.S. military supremacy.

Clark has this to say about the U.N.: "The Charter of the U.N. and the Constitution of the United States were corrupted to become instruments of war in the Fall of 1990. Both were easily subverted to authorize unrestrained power and unlimited military aggression." Clark urges reforms to end what he describes as our national pastime—"the glorification of violence." He further recommends that we prohibit development of weapons of war and mass destruction; establish U.N. oversight of arms and military actions; create new principles to control the use of military forces; and prohibit foreign military and political influence in other countries. These are just a few of Clark's recommendations.

The Fire This Time is not a book I would include in a military reading list. I say this because it portrays our government, its leaders, and the U.S. military as "demonic" and largely motivated by greed and power.

Michael S. Evancevich
Fort Huachuca, AZ

Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon, August 1982-February 1984 by Ralph A. Hallenbeck (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 248 pages, \$47.95.

Dr. Hallenbeck examines the U.S. diplomatic intervention in Lebanon in the early 1980's, when the U.S., under the Reagan Administration, aggressively attempted to influence Near East affairs. The objective of this effort was to have all foreign armies withdraw from Lebanese soil and to breathe new life into the faltering Arab-Israeli peace talks—negotiations which were bogged down because of both Lebanese and Palestinian politics. In hindsight, it was a positive and bold move on the part of the U.S.; however, according to Hallenbeck, it failed unequivocally.

After the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in June 1982, the U.S. set out to do nothing less than to put an end to the domestic violence in Lebanon; to effect an orderly and complete withdrawal of opposing Israeli, Syrian, and Palestinian forces; and to re-establish dialogue between Israel and its neighbors. Yet, by February 1984,

U.S. troops had spent some 18 months in Beirut, and despite their efforts it was obvious that none of the Reagan Administration goals were going to be realized. In fact, the U.S. as well as other nations in the peacekeeping force, sadly, lost hundreds of lives in the process.

Hallenbeck was personally involved in planning, supporting, and controlling the activities of our Marine and Naval forces in Lebanon during this period. He was assigned to the Army's European Command and witnessed firsthand the tragic events as they unfolded.

His book presents three perspectives. First, it gives an account of U.S. intervention in Lebanon and, as Hallenbeck says, in doing so it testifies to "...those who sacrificed their lives for what was a thankless but right minded undertaking." Second, the book offers students of public policy, foreign policy, and national security a case study on politico-military analysis and decision making. Third, it is Hallenbeck's personal attempt to reappraise the conceptualization of politico-military policies and practices by the U.S. Executive Branch to application in field situations.

Overall, the book accomplishes these tasks well with such chapters as "The United States Intervenes in Lebanon," "A Mid-Course Correction," "The Unravelling," "Force Displaces Diplomacy," and "Distillation and Assessment." Following each chapter is an analysis section. Here the author compares his analysis with others of the Vietnam War in order to explore the many parallels between the U.S. intervention in Lebanon and its experience in Vietnam during the two preceding decades. To its credit, the book also contains maps, a glossary, references cited, a comprehensive bibliography, and a chronology of events.

This clearly written book would be a valuable addition to any library. It is a significant contribution to the literature of politico-military issues because of its detailed historical coverage of the topic and its insightful analysis throughout. This book will prove a welcome tool for students, policy makers, and operational commanders alike.

Henry W. Pruncun Jr.
South Australia

Six Days in June: How Israel Won the 1967 Arab-Israeli War by Eric Hammel (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), 452 pages, \$30.00.

The causes and conduct of the 1967 Six Day War come under scrutiny in a book that, unfortunately, falls short of its potential. Although the author gives a sound account of the fighting, he fails to explain what it all means. Almost a blow-by-blow historical account, the book suffers from myopia: it describes the war at too small a scale. Hammel gets too caught up in the minutia and fails to provide clear, understandable lessons learned.

Three of the book's seven sections cover Israel's military history and her inexorable spiral toward war. Four sections cover the war in each theater: the Golan Heights, West Bank, Sinai, and Jerusalem. Hammel credits Israel's victory to the quality of the Israeli Defense Forces's plan-

Forces's planning and leadership. He believes their concept of "adherence to mission" gives their commanders great flexibility, and gave Israel an advantage over her Arab foes. Under this concept, subordinate commanders are encouraged, as the leader closest to the battle, to make decisions and to use initiative.

Hammel supports his thesis well. He draws many examples of commanders overcoming the fog of war to outsmart their opponents. He covers the conflict in-depth, naming leaders down to platoon level and recounting battlefield exploits. Hammel thoroughly covers every battle, engagement, and encounter, making the book a valuable historical source. Although exhaustively researched, this work falls in two areas: it lacks solid lessons learned, and it fails to treat its subject objectively. Hammel's two-page epilogue offers no conclusions or insights about the war. And his strong pro-Israel bias clouds his view of what actually happened, such as in the 1956 battle of Abu Aghella.

Hammel's analysis of Israel's decision to go to war is interesting. It investigates the strategic level indicators that led Israel to believe Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were preparing for war. This portion of the book could be useful to strategic analysts by showing them some of the factors another country used in making threat determinations.

Hammel's research ability and writing skills deserve much praise. However, his failure to provide lessons learned condemns his book to history textbook status. His accounts of battles are interesting and exciting, but he fails to provide the insight readers could learn from. Although fine reading, this book provides little of value to intelligence professionals.

2LT Frank Sobchak
Fort Lauderdale, FL

The Warrior's Edge by retired Army Colonel John B. Alexander; Major Richard Groller, USAR; and Janet Morris (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1990), 240 pages, \$19.95.

Reading this book requires an open mind. Most conventional thinkers won't be receptive to concepts such as telepathy—using the human mind to tap into the thoughts of others; and psychokinesis—altering or affecting molecular states. Such concepts require a belief system flexible enough to encompass UFOs and Elvis sightings. The book outlines the methodology of the Jedi project—a project designed to bring unconventional thought to the Army and to make those concepts teachable.

The Jedi project was developed from a commercial self-help program, known as neuro-linguistic programming, and packaged as a seminar to senior officers and government officials. The idea is to model yourself after the "best" in a particular field. The Jedi project used the Army Marksmanship Unit as an example. Select marksmanship team members created a universal shooting model and translated it into a 2-day training program. Two groups were selected, one control and one test, to compare marksmanship training.

The control group spent the traditional

time (27 hours) in the traditional way, and qualified 73 percent of the participants with 10 percent qualifying as experts. The test group spent 12 hours and qualified 100 percent of its members, with 25 percent qualifying as experts. This study isn't completely scientific, but it does show that modeling might improve the results of traditional training programs in a shorter time.

A chapter on Influence outlines several techniques used to favorably change others' behavior. One idea is to mirror the subject's sensory intake preferences. Each person has a dominant preference: Auditory, visual, or physical. By appealing to a person's preferred style of intake you stand a better chance of receiving a positive response.

Other chapters address reality mapping, visualization, intuitive decision making, remote viewing, and biofeedback. I personally enjoyed the book, although some of the concepts are a bit far afield for me. With our continuing good relations with the Soviets, we may eventually learn if some of these Iron Curtain mysteries are true. As for the remaining concepts, only time will tell.

1LT John Burkholder
Campbellsville, KY



The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 edited by Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (New York: The New Press, 1992), 415 pages, \$25.00.

The Cuban Missile Crisis continues to be in the forefront of historical interest and the subject of books and television specials. However, few of these sources paint an adequate picture of the interactions between the three principals of this drama: The United States, Cuba, and the former Soviet Union. This book provides an excellent "fly on the wall" account of events during 1962 that brought the two superpowers to the brink of nuclear war.

Using formerly classified documents, the editors illustrate the misinterpretations, miscalculations, and a lack of under-

standing on the part of the key players. The book also has a detailed chronology of events, a concise biography of key players, and an in-depth bibliography.

Students of both strategic and tactical international relations will find much of value here. The book does a wonderful job of detailing the problems with "crisis management" that all parties, from field commanders to senior decision makers, experienced.

Unfortunately, because of the unavailability of Soviet and Cuban documents, the book focuses almost entirely on the Washington perspective. Nevertheless, this is an indispensable resource for those in the business of assessing possible outcomes of using military force, as we in MI are.

SPC Elliot A. Jardines
Albuquerque, NM

The OSS in Italy, 1942-1945 (A Personal Memoir) by Max Corvo (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 324 pages, \$29.95.

The operations of World War II's Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—the forerunner of the CIA—have engaged authors for over half a century. This book is one of the better offerings because of author Corvo's actual involvement in OSS operations in Italy. An Army draftee in early 1942, Max Corvo conceived a plan for the conduct of intelligence activities in Italy. He was assigned to the "fledgling" OSS and eventually became one of the mainstays of the "Italian Special Intelligence (SI) Branch."

This is an excellent overview of an area of operations that during the war was often shortchanged in men and material, and after the war was ignored. From early 1942 when Italian SI was founded in Algeria, Corvo takes the reader into the inner circles for an "up close and personal" look at how operations were planned and carried out.

Using first-generation Italian-Americans and Italian exiles, the OSS built Italian SI into a first class intelligence-gathering tool. At war's end, Corvo and his people were credited with some of the finest support operations of the entire war. One of the highlights was a 13-day period when nearly 800,000 pounds of supplies were parachuted in 135 sorties, while SIGINT assets processed 41,500 cipher groups to teams all over Northern Italy. Credit must also be given to British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and their other special operations units that worked closely with the OSS.

Some of the most interesting reading describes British Intelligence's parochialism in relation to Britain's attempts to "adjust" the post-war Balkans to suit their purposes in 1945.

As in any good book, personalities emerge and celebrities are seen in a new light. For example, Allen Dulles used Italian SI assets extensively, but ironically was instrumental in its early demise in 1945. Here, Corvo effectively draws a picture of the turf battle that emerged after World War II that would eventually give birth to the CIA. In this battle, the "non-professionals" (translate "persons without the right connections") were excluded from taking part in the formation of the CIA. A recently declassified report reveals

that Italian SI personnel were judged to be "not of the background, education, or training...which would prepare them for the entirely new world of postwar secret intelligence." The astute reader would ask, "What criteria were used in this assessment since no one prior to 1940 had an 'official' role in American Intelligence?"

Another personality to emerge was James Angleton, Chief, X-2, Counterintelligence. Angleton remained in secret intelligence and later became a legend in his career at the CIA.

The only criticism of Corvo's book is the lack of a concluding chapter to tie together lessons learned from Italian SI. Nevertheless, Corvo conducts a fair examination of the efforts and activities of a part of America's first secret intelligence organization.

MAJ Rick Ugino, ARNG
Buffalo, NY

Rethinking America's Security
edited by Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 479 pages, \$29.95.

American security during the Cold War was shaped by the protracted struggle between the superpowers. With the USSR's demise, the U.S. must now reconsider its security, just as it did at the end of World War II. The book's editors have assembled some of the top political scientists and international security specialists to address this issue. These experts suggest a realignment of U.S. defense posture to meet the "new world order."

George Ball, Henry Kissinger, John Mearshelmer, and Paul Wolfowitz are but a

few of the authors featured. There are two key questions the book attempts to answer: "To what extent does the new world order affect a country's social cohesion and economic strength and how important are these factors in determining success?" and "To what extent does the U.S. need to reconsider its national security in domestic terms—improved economic competitiveness and living within its means?"


One of the most interesting sections, entitled "Rethinking the Dimensions of National Security," defines new technological, economic, and global dimensions. The contributors contend that a fundamental rethinking must occur at the highest levels of government to restore economic vitality. While some argue for unipolar world government to solve America's security problems, most of the authors believe the U.S. must realign itself to ensure world peace and security. The consensus seems to be that the U.S. needs to re-examine its finances to bring them in line with reality.

The overriding message is that national security is not simply a matter of identifying threats and defending them, especially in today's changing world. Security is international. Increasingly, states are interdependent, and the security of all is enhanced when they agree on the rules of their international system. Here are some of the more controversial recommendations: because of their economic power, Germany and Japan should be given permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council; a U.N. rapid deployment force should be created; a multinational effort should be made to stop the spread of weapons of mass-destruction; and the existing institutions in Europe should be used to stop the spread of ethnic conflicts. On the last count Europe has already failed terribly.

The editors conclude that while the U.S. lacks the material resources to provide security in the new world order, it has resources of the "spirit." Although internationalist in flavor, the book does point out some of the factors which directly affect U.S. national security.

The Cold War conclusions may be outdated but the authors use history as a starting point from which to reach their theories. For college students and those interested in international affairs, you will use this book both as a reference and as applicable for intelligence professionals.

CPT Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF
San Antonio, TX





319th Military Intelligence Brigade

Oriental blue and silver gray/silver are the MI colors. The griffin, a mythical beast with keen eyesight and acute hearing, symbolizes constant vigilance. The helmet with the visor closed signifies covert capabilities as well as military preparedness. The sunburst represents knowledge and truth and the lightning bolt represents electronic communications, speed, and accuracy.

The 319th Headquarters Intelligence Detachment was organized in the Reserve Corps and assigned to 1st Army on June 15, 1948, at Springfield, MA. It was inactivated on September 22, 1949, and relieved from assignment to 1st Army. On August 18, 1950, the 319th was redesignated as an MI Group and activated on September 1, 1950, at San Francisco. On February 1, 1953, it was inactivated again.

On September 17, 1988, the 319th was redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 319th MI Brigade, assigned to

the 124th Army Reserve Command and activated at Fort Lewis, WA.

The 319th MI Brigade is unique in both its organization and mission: it is an EAC unit and is the only MI brigade in the Army Reserves. During peacetime, the brigade has command and control of two MI battalions and three MI detachments located in California and Washington State. The 319th MI Brigade's (HHC) wartime mission is to support the 500th MI Brigade (EAC), Camp Zama, Japan.

To prepare for their wartime mission, 319th MI Brigade soldiers take part in overseas deployment training, which integrates 319th soldiers into the positions they would occupy during wartime. The unit also participates in exercises that enhance MOS skills, evaluate mobility preparedness, and interface with joint and allied forces. Our soldiers also get MOS sustainment training at the Reserve training site (intelligence) in Novato, CA, and by live environment training.

The 319th also participates in mobilization exercises that are designed to evaluate its capability to deploy and conduct operations. At the Fort Lewis Simulation Center in August, the brigade headquarters will conduct an exercise which the 500th MI Brigade will evaluate. Exercises like these will culminate in the Army's first EAC MI Brigade Army Roadiness Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The 319th MI Brigade has prepared a unit training plan to support this program.

Each year, the 319th supports KEEN EDGE/YAMA SAKURA. This is a bilateral command post exercise coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sponsored by U.S. Forces Japan and the Joint Staff Office. The brigade's joint collection management asset supports collection requirements management up to the theater headquarters level. For the last 3 years, collection personnel participated in exercises at Pacific Command Headquarters, IX Corps, and the 500th MI Brigade.

Subordinate units of the 319th have stepped up their support to the intelligence community. Several units support I Corps and the SIGINT Roadiness Facility at Fort Lewis. One unit was identified as being the best of its kind Armywide through its performance during Exercise CASCADE PEAK. In addition to exercises, members of the 319th volunteered or were activated for Desert Shield and Desert Storm in either an intelligence or service support capacity.

With the 319th MI Brigade's unique organization and diverse intelligence support requirements, individual soldiers have numerous opportunities to refine their MOS skills and provide critical support to ongoing intelligence activities.